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Abstract 
This paper presents a methodology for calculating the potential impact of the new 
socio-ecological transition away from fossil fuels on employment in EU energy supply. 
The methodology is based on “employment factors” (i.e. labour intensities) of different 
energy technologies. These employment factors are applied to changing energy mixes 
as projected by the decarbonisation scenarios of the European Commission’s Energy 
Roadmap 2050. In particular, we analyse quantitative (number of jobs) and qualitative 
(qualification levels) impacts on employment in extraction and processing of primary 
(fossil) fuels and in the power sector for the years 2020, 2030 and 2050. The results 
show that the energy sector will provide not only more jobs as the new socio-ecological 
transition unfolds, but also jobs requiring higher-level qualifications when compared 
with the current energy sector. 
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Introduction 
European energy policy aims to address environmental sustainability, security of 
supplies and economic competitiveness as its three principle objectives. Increasing the 
share of renewable energy sources (RES) in the energy mix is a central element of the 
current EU energy policy framework. In fact, RES will play a key role in achieving the 
long-term EU target of reducing domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80% by 
2050 (compared with 1990). It is undisputed that the increasing substitution of fossil 
fuels with RES and other low-carbon energy sources will decrease EU GHG emissions. 
Similarly, there is evidence that RES can benefit security of supply by reducing 
dependence on fossil fuel imports from third countries. However, the impact of such a 
substitution on competitiveness, growth and jobs is less clear. The banking crisis, 
followed by the economic and then the sovereign debt crises, has caused policy-makers 
to refocus their priorities on economic growth and combating rising unemployment. 
The costs of energy are now of primary concern, given their impact on competitiveness 
of EU industry. Similarly, in 2013 the unemployment rate of the EU has reached its 
highest level since the start of the crisis in 2008. These developments have intensified 
the debate about the links of energy policy to growth and employment and in 
particular about how the EU can decarbonise its economy without negatively affecting 
industry and businesses and thus employment (see Egenhofer et al., 2013).  
This paper analyses how the long-term decarbonisation of the energy sector may 
impact employment levels and related educational qualifications required in Europe. It 
focuses on employment impacts on the extraction and processing of primary (fossil) 
fuels in Europe, as well as on conversion activities in the power sector. This is done for 
the years 2020, 2030 and 2050. The paper assesses both new jobs created by the 
increasing share of electricity in final energy consumption as well as jobs destroyed in 
fossil fuel extraction and processing and in carbon-intensive power generation. It thus 
takes into account both positive and negative effects on employment and provides 
figures about the net employment effect of the new socio-ecological transition away 
from fossil fuels in the energy supply sector. The paper identifies European trends, but 
the methodology applied for the EU is also tested on the member-state level in three 
case studies presented in the Annex. 
                                                   
 Arno Behrens is Head of Energy & Research Fellow, Caroline Coulie is Research Assistant, Fabio 
Genoese is Research Fellow, Monica Alessi is Programme Manager, Julian Wieczorkiewiecz is 
Research Assistant and Christian Egenhofer is Head of the Energy and Climate Programme & Senior 
Research Fellow at CEPS.  
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Energy in the context of the NEUJOBS project 
This paper is a deliverable of Work Package 11 on “Energy and Green Jobs” of the 
NEUJOBS project (NEUJOBS WP11). The objective of NEUJOBS is “to analyse future 
possible developments of the European labour market(s) under the main assumption 
that European societies are now facing or preparing to face four main transitions that 
will have a major impact on employment” (NEUJOBS, 2013). One of these four 
transitions is the so-called socio-ecological transition (SET), which is the focus of this 
paper. A SET is a transition from one socio-ecological regime to another, where a 
regime is defined as “a specific fundamental pattern of interaction between (human) 
society and natural systems” (Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 2007). Such a regime can 
also be characterised by the dominant energy sources and conversion technologies 
(Fischer-Kowalski et al., 2012). Although there are different socio-ecological regimes 
and, correspondingly, different SETs (see Section 2.1), NEUJOBS is concerned with a 
“new” transition “away from fossil fuels, towards solar and other low-carbon energy 
sources” (Fischer-Kowalski et al., 2012).  
It has already been discussed in NEUJOBS D1.1 (Fischer-Kowalski et al., 2012) and 
NEUJOBS D11.1 (Behrens et al., 2013) that the new socio-ecological transition goes 
beyond the energy sector. In fact, it requires a comprehensive change in the patterns of 
social organisation and culture, production and consumption as humanity progresses 
beyond the current industrial model towards a more sustainable society. There are thus 
many more causes and effects of a SET than purely energy related ones. However, the 
energy sector is at the heart of the SET away from fossil fuels. This warrants the 
approach taken in NEUJOBS WP11 of looking at different decarbonisation options – 
within the context of a SET – and analysing what these options could imply for the 
labour market. Decarbonisation in NEUJOBS WP11 is thus not considered to be a 
proxy for a more complex SET, but a key response strategy to current environmental 
and social challenges – albeit one of several such strategies – and therefore also a key 
component of a SET. 
When discussing the energy sector, a distinction needs to be made between energy 
supply and energy demand. NEUJOBS WP11 focuses exclusively on energy supply, 
and in particular on the power sector. Supply includes all aspects related to the 
production and supply of energy, including the extraction of natural resources, 
conversion activities (mainly electricity generation) and transport (including 
transmission and distribution). Demand, on the other hand, covers final consumption 
by sector. In the EU27, final consumption in 2011 was divided between transport 
(33%), industry (26%), households (25%), services (13%), agriculture (2%) and fishing 
(0.1%) (European Commission, 2013a). The potential impact of the SET on employment 
within the housing sector is assessed in NEUJOBS WP14 (including energy savings 
technologies). The impact of the SET on employment in the transport sector is 
examined in NEUJOBS WP15, including the effect of socio-ecological trends on job 
location, commuting and land use. 
NEUJOBS WP11 is divided into three deliverables. The first deliverable (D11.1) reviews 
various decarbonisation scenarios for the energy sector and thus serves as a 
background document for assessing the impacts of a transition away from fossil fuels 
towards low-carbon energy technologies on employment in Europe. This paper (D11.2) 
assesses the impact of selected decarbonisation scenarios on employment in Europe. It 
is the core deliverable of WP11. Finally, the third deliverable (D11.3) provides concrete 
policy options to address labour market issues during the transition to a low-carbon 
energy sector in the EU. 
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The policy context 
As early as 1996, the EU adopted a long-term target of limiting the global temperature 
increase to a maximum of 2°C above pre-industrial levels (Council of the European 
Union, 1996). This position has been reiterated on several occasions, including at the 
Environmental Council meeting held in October 2013 (Council of the European Union, 
2013). Since 2009 in Copenhagen and later in Cancún (UNFCCC, 2010, 2011), countries 
have made similar pledges that aim to limit the increase in global average temperature 
to 2°C by the end of the century compared with pre-industrial levels. 
To achieve this global objective, on several occasions the EU has stated that developed 
countries as a group would need to reduce their emissions by between 80% and 95% by 
2050 (European Council, 2009, 2011). In addition, the EU adopted its Climate and 
Energy Package in 2007-09, which set out the EU’s strategy and policies up to 2020. The 
EU is currently discussing a new climate and energy framework for the post-2020 
period, based on Commission proposals for new energy and climate objectives to be 
met by 2030 (European Commission, 2014). 
Results of the decarbonisation scenario analysis 
Before assessing the potential impacts of a decarbonisation of the energy sector on 
employment in Europe, it is useful to summarise some key results of the scenario 
analysis conducted for NEUJOBS D11.1 (Behrens et al., 2013). The paper takes a broad 
range of scenarios into account – from international institutions (European 
Commission, IEA, IIASA), European research projects (AMPERE, SECURE), NGOs 
(European Climate Foundation, Greenpeace) and industry (Eurelectric) – all of which 
depict a decarbonisation of the EU energy sector in line with the projected EU 
contribution to limiting global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. 
The paper concludes that decarbonisation of the EU economy is possible using 
currently known technologies. Regarding energy demand, the study shows that 
demand is likely to decrease by some 2-6% until 2020, and by 20-30% by 2050 
(compared with 2010). The share of RES increases from around 10% in 2011 to around 
20% in 2020 and to somewhat above 40% by 2050. Fossil fuels will continue to play an 
important role, but their share in the energy mix is likely to decrease from more than 
three quarters in 2011 to around 70% in 2020 and to 40-50% in 2050. 
The power sector is likely to be the main enabler of decarbonisation and many 
scenarios assume a decarbonisation by up to 95% by 2050 (compared with 1990). These 
savings will need to be achieved in the face of growing electricity demand. In fact, all 
decarbonisation scenarios project growing electricity generation, mainly driven by 
increasing demand in transport and heating/cooling. By 2020, electricity demand is 
likely to grow by about 5-10%, while the increase may be in the range of 30-50% by 
2050 (both compared with 2010). Energy efficiency and the upscaling of RES are the 
two key strategies to decarbonise the power sector. Regarding RES, their share in 
power generation is generally projected to increase from about 20% in 2020 to 35% in 
2020 and 60-85% in 2050. Wind and hydro will be the most important RES in power 
generation in 2020. By 2050, biomass and solar PV will also contribute significantly to 
the electricity mix. There is large uncertainty about the importance of nuclear and 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) in power generation. 
It is important to note that the rising share of variable RES, such as wind and solar PV, 
will require an increase in installed electric capacity larger than the increase in power 
output. This is due to lower capacity factors of intermittent RES. In order to have 
sufficient levels of back-up capacity (and provided that there is no change in power 
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market design), electrical capacity is projected to increase by about 20-30% by 2020 and 
by 80-100% by 2050, both compared with 2010. As electric capacity expands faster than 
generated output, the capacity/generation ratio1 increases substantially in most 
scenarios. While it is still at around 2.2-2.4:1 in 2010, it increases to around 2.5-2.7:1 by 
2020 and reaches some 3-4:1 by 2050. This means that each unit of electricity produced 
in 2050 may need to be backed-up by up to four equivalent units of installed capacity 
to cover for intermittencies. However, the flexibility of the electricity system needed to 
enable the supply-demand balance with high levels of renewable generation will not 
only be achieved through additional generation capacity, but also through better 
interconnection of transmission lines, more flexible distribution, demand-side response 
and management, and storage. 
Scope of this paper 
This paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter situates the green jobs 
approach within the concepts of sustainable development, the green economy and 
green growth. Following a definition of these concepts, the chapter gives an account of 
the argumentation in Europe linking the transition to a green, low-carbon and 
resource-efficient economy with developments in the labour market. Chapter 2 focuses 
on the energy sector, starting with a definition of a socio-ecological transition and a 
brief overview of past transitions in Europe and how they lead to changing energy 
bases of societies. The chapter then provides an overview of the current EU energy 
sector in general and its power sector in particular, before describing the main changes 
to be expected within the power sector as decarbonisation progresses. Chapter 3 is the 
core of this paper, looking at current patterns of employment in the power sector as 
well as future developments both quantitatively and qualitatively. Based on the 
Reference scenario and two representative decarbonisation scenarios of the Energy 
Roadmap 2050 (European Commission, 2011a) it calculates the potential impacts of the 
decarbonisation of the energy sector on (direct) employment in Europe. Its main focus 
is on the EU as a whole, but it also includes a section on regional implications based on 
the results of the three case studies presented in Annex I. Chapter 3 only deals with 
employment aspects related to the extraction of natural resources, conversion activities 
and transmission and distribution in the power sector. It covers neither long-distance 
transport of gas (through pipelines) nor the supply chain of power generation (e.g. 
supply of materials for power plants). Given the latter, it only briefly touches on the 
potential effects of exports of low-carbon technologies on employment in Europe. It 
also includes a brief section on some of the potential fiscal implications. Finally, 
Chapter 4 presents key findings and conclusions. The methodology used for 
calculating the employment impacts in the EU is also tested in the context of three 
member state case studies, which are presented in the Annex. These case studies allow 
for linking the findings for the EU with the situation in Poland, Sweden and Spain, 
which are in different geographical regions and have quite different energy 
backgrounds and energy futures. 
NEUJOBS targets two time horizons: 2025 and 2050. However, the approach adopted 
for the whole of WP11 is to focus on 2020 and 2050, in order to align with the 
milestones of current EU energy and climate change policies. 2020 is the target year of 
                                                   
1 The capacity/generation ratio puts the installed capacity in relation with the projected generated 
electricity output. It is calculated by converting installed capacity into a theoretical generation 
maximum, which would be reached if total installed capacity produced electricity at full capacity for 
every single hour of the year (a total of 8,760 hours), i.e. if the capacity factor for all installed capacity 
was 100%. 
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the energy and climate change package adopted in 2009 and most studies use it as a 
time horizon. Similarly, 2050 provides a reference year for decarbonisation of the EU 
economy as referred to in various scenarios and roadmaps. In addition, this study also 
provides figures for 2030 in order to link with the ongoing debate about the EU’s 2030 
climate and energy framework. 
The assessment is based on a comprehensive literature review, our own calculations 
based on publicly available statistics, as well as on interviews with experts from 
governments and industry as well as their associations (see Annex 2). The authors 
thank interviewees for their time and input. 
1. From sustainable development to green jobs 
The green jobs approach is linked to the sustainable development, green growth and 
green economy concepts. This chapter defines these concepts and explains how they 
frame the research on employment in the context of the transition to a low-carbon 
energy system. 
1.1 Origin of the sustainable development concept and its theoretical 
offsprings 
This section outlines the evolution of the concept of sustainable development, and its 
ramification for the similar but separate concepts of green growth and green economy. 
1.1.1 Sustainable development 
In order to address growing concerns over the “accelerating deterioration of the human 
environment and natural resources and the consequences of that deterioration for 
economic and social development” (UNGA, 1987), the UN convened in 1983 the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), chaired by Norwegian Prime 
Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, and including representatives from both developed 
and developing countries. In 1987, the Commission “produced the landmark 
publication Our Common Future (or the Brundtland report) that provided a stark 
diagnosis of the state of the environment” (Drexhage and Murphy, 2010: 7). The report 
introduced the first definition of sustainable development as “[development that] 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987: par. 27). Acceptance of the report by the 
United Nations General Assembly gave the term political salience, and “the 
Brundtland report provided the momentum for the landmark 1992 Rio Summit that 
laid the foundations for the global institutionalization of sustainable development” 
(Drexhage and Murphy, 2010: 8). The Summit adopted the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (the “Rio Declaration”), which set out 27 principles of 
sustainable development, and Agenda 21, a global plan of action for sustainable 
development addressing “the social and economic dimensions of sustainable 
development, conservation and management of natural resources, the role of major 
groups, and means of implementation” (Drexhage and Murphy, 2010: 8). 
However, the concept of sustainable development does not constitute per se an 
approach to achieve sustainability. It has no articulated economic philosophy or 
strategy, leaving it open to interpretation. Two main and quite similar economic 
approaches to sustainable development have emerged from this concept, namely 
“green growth“ and “green economy“ (see AtKisson (2012) for a comparison of the 
approaches). Both are based on the concept that, to a large extent, the pursuit of 
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economic growth can be compatible with the concept of sustainable development. 
These two approaches, however, are not universally accepted by mainstream 
environmentally oriented critics who question their actual sustainability. 
1.1.2 Green growth 
The concept of green growth was first introduced by the consultancy McKinsey & 
Company and proposes a low-carbon strategy to achieve climate change objectives. It 
was subsequently championed by the United Nations as an implementation strategy at 
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. The Global 
Green Growth Institute in South Korea is currently the main research centre working 
on developing the concept of green growth (AtKisson, 2012). The green growth 
approach is centred on emission reduction approaches and focuses primarily on 
energy.   
As summarised by AtKisson (2012), the green growth approach can be criticised for 
being too limited due to its quasi-exclusive focus on emission reductions and energy, 
and as such for not ensuring sustainability. It mainly consists of a “top-down” 
government-driven strategy with little involvement of the wider stakeholder 
community. The ultimate goal is growth defined in a very similar way to the 
traditional growth concept, but within the limits of a low-carbon and more resource-
efficient path. Green growth exponents also emphasise its higher job-generating 
capacities compared with traditional growth paths. Green growth considers that 
market failures and pricing of resources are the key issues to be addressed.  
The green growth concept has primarily been embraced by industrialised countries as 
a way out of the present economic recession, due to its combined promise of economic 
growth and employment generation without fundamental challenges to the basic 
premises of existing economic structures. While green growth can lead to a more 
resource-efficient economy, it still represents an unsustainable path to development; 
the physical limits of the planet would just be met at a slower pace (AtKisson, 2012). 
1.1.3 Green economy 
In order to combine the positive aspects of a green growth strategy, with actual 
sustainable development, a new initiative by the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asian and the Pacific (UNESCAP) was launched in 2008, namely the 
“Green Economy“ (Allen and Clouth, 2012). This initiative complements the green 
growth approach seeking to ensure that the sum of all economic activities ultimately 
lead to maintaining economic development within the limits of what the planet can 
sustain. It considers it possible to include selective de-growth, i.e. curtailing activities 
in certain sectors. While green growth still essentially leaves the market to determine 
the growth path, the “green economy“ concept accepts the need for some government 
intervention and requests other indicators beyond GDP growth. UNEP defines green 
economy as “result[ing] in improved human wellbeing and social equity, while 
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities” (UNEP, 2011). 
However, agreement on green economy indicators proves difficult, and at present 
green growth remains the main strategy. 
In sum, the difference between the two concepts is that green growth is a development 
strategy striving to introduce sustainable development in economic activities already 
implemented in many regions of the world, while the green economy concept is a more 
comprehensive approach that gives a vision of the economy we should strive for. 
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1.1.4 Europe’s green growth policy approach 
The EU has embraced the concepts of sustainability and green growth in its economic 
strategy documents. The latest Europe 2020 strategy follows the “green growth” 
approach, seeking to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The strategy 
targets the dual objective of helping Europe achieve economic growth and increase 
employment, while also keeping in line with its commitments in the area of climate 
change. The employment dimension is included in the headline declarations of the 
Commission’s climate and energy package: “It is estimated that meeting the 20% 
renewable energy target could have a net effect of creating around 417,000 additional 
jobs, while getting on track to achieve the 20% energy efficiency improvement in 2020 
is forecast to boost net employment by some 400,000 jobs” (European Commission, 
2013b).  
The strategic documents of the EU are based on the concepts of “sustainable growth” 
and “green growth”, but while these terms have a specific historical and theoretical 
foundation, the EU has adapted them and developed its own interpretation. This 
section compares the concepts as defined in Section 1.1 above with the EU’s 
interpretation. 
1.1.4.1 The 1993 White Paper on competitiveness and growth 
The green technology path predates by two decades the newest Europe 2020 strategy, 
well before the green growth concept was developed. After the creation of the single 
market in 1992, the EU sought to work out its development strategy, aware that its 
growth rates were below potential. The growing awareness of the lack of sustainability 
in the Western economic model led to the White Paper of 1993 on competitiveness and 
growth (European Commission, 1993). In the White Paper the EU sets out its economic 
development vision, which incorporates the need for a more sustainable socio-
economic and environmental development path, seeking growth within the context of 
a knowledge-based, innovative and clean economy.  
The strategy was based on two pillars: knowledge and innovation on the one hand, 
and sustainability on the other. The first pillar is largely based on the writings of the 
economist Joseph Schumpeter, who stipulates that economic growth is driven by 
innovation. The strategy went beyond the focus on resource efficiency (including 
energy efficiency and pollution abatement) to outline benefits in terms of growth, 
competitiveness and employment. To some extent, this can be considered a first step 
towards the sustainable development concept, within the bounds of the European 
economic reality, and resembles the green growth strategy concept emerging a decade 
later. Energy efficiency and resource efficiency are already presented as important 
tools to expand competitiveness2 as well as reducing the ecological damage in Europe 
originating from industries. 
The publication of the White Paper, while influential to some extent, did not lead to 
significant policy actions. Growth rates were still sluggish compared with the US, 
while emerging economies became an increasing competitive challenge for Europe, 
threatening its trading position in many sectors.  
                                                   
2 “Ecotechnologies will soon provide a major competitive advantage” (European Commission, 1993). 
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1.1.4.2 The Lisbon strategy 
As a response to the lack of structural reform in member states, the EU launched in 
2000 the so-called Lisbon strategy, which set the ambitious objective to “[by 2010] 
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion” (European Parliament, 2000). The Lisbon strategy was based on the same 
principles as the White Paper. 
The Lisbon strategy, however, did not include particular obligations for member states, 
or targets, or a clarification of what the “most dynamic knowledge economy” meant in 
practical terms. Member states officially committed to following the general 
recommendations through national policy reforms. However, a mid-term review in 
2004 (the “Wim Kok report”) showed progress to be very limited. This led to an 
attempt to strengthen the strategy with a stronger focus on growth and jobs (“the 
Lisbon II strategy”). 
Nevertheless, the lack of solid commitments and the focus on often-chaotic emergency 
policy responses to the financial crisis led again to a lack of tangible results. However, 
the severity of the financial crisis and its impacts laid bare the structural weaknesses of 
member states. Weak innovative capacity, lack of skills, inflexible and low-skilled 
labour markets were linked not only to economic depression, but also to the prospect 
of a long recession and an erosion of European trade competitiveness. This led to a 
new impetus and to the introduction of the Europe 2020 strategy, a growth strategy for 
the period 2010-2020. 
1.1.4.3 The Europe 2020 strategy 
Europe 2020 focuses on overcoming the economic crisis and is still significantly linked 
to the 1993 White Paper. It has strengthened its sustainability objectives, and in 
particular the focus on energy and resource efficiency, which is influenced by the EU 
policy on climate change, as well as concerns about energy security. The main focus is 
on decoupling growth and resource consumption, which would allow the pursuit of 
economic growth while at the same time decreasing its damaging effects on the 
environment. Europe 2020 thus follows primarily the green growth approach, but it 
also integrates some elements of sustainable development in its environmental and 
social dimensions. It is based on three growth pillars: smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth. These aim at developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation, 
promoting a more resource-efficient, greener and more competitive economy, fostering 
high-employment, as well as delivering social and territorial cohesion. It is not, 
however, a green economy strategy. Europe 2020 has as a primary overarching goal to 
foster growth and employment and is set up as a strategy to re-launch the economy 
and foster competitiveness, and not as such to ensure real sustainability, as defined by 
the green economy concept. 
In order to achieve the three growth pillars, the EU has listed the following five 
headline targets, giving a quantitative meaning and focus to the strategy. By 2020 the 
EU should: 
- employ 75% of 20-64 year olds; 
- invest 3% of the EU’s GDP in research and development; 
- reduce GHG emissions by 20% or even 30% compared with 1990 levels, create 
20% of EU energy needs from RES and increase energy efficiency by 20%; 
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- reduce school dropout rates to below 10% and ensure that at least 40% of 30–34 
year olds complete tertiary education; and 
- reduce poverty and lift at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. 
Contrary to its predecessors, this strategy articulates its priorities through specific 
targets, which are to be translated into national targets in each EU member state. These 
targets are also reflected in the seven flagship initiatives, which provide the framework 
for the actions of the EU and member states towards the objectives of Europe 2020. 
Table 1 relates the flagship initiatives to the three pillars of Europe 2020. 
Table 1. The Flagship initiatives 
Smart Growth Sustainable Growth  Inclusive Growth 
Digital Agenda for Europe Resource-efficient Europe An agenda for new skills 
and jobs 
Innovation Union An industrial policy for the 
globalisation era 
European platform against 
poverty and exclusion 
Youth on the move   
Source: European Commission, 2012a. 
All initiatives integrate aspects of “green growth”, such as the reinforcement of the 
research into renewable energy for Horizon 2020 called for by the Innovation Union 
flagship initiative, but the Resource-efficient Europe initiative (European Commission, 
2011b) is the core of the green growth component. This initiative aims to change the 
way the economy works by reducing its reliance on non-renewable energy and finite 
resources, while promoting the efficient use of all inputs and reducing pollution and 
waste. The flagship initiative seeks to focus on developing the green technology 
market. This should lead to a more sustainable as well as more competitive Europe by: 
- boosting economic performance while reducing resource use; 
- identifying and creating new opportunities for economic growth and greater 
innovation, and boosting the EU's competitiveness; 
- ensuring security of supply of essential resources; and 
- fighting against climate change and limiting the environmental impacts of natural 
resource use (European Commission, 2011b). 
The Resource-efficient Europe initiative includes a wide range of components in many 
different policy areas. Several EU-level initiatives related to energy efficiency, the 
transition to a low-carbon economy, reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
and the strategy to make the EU a “circular economy“, are expected to contribute to the 
implementation of this initiative. Key benchmarks for the initiative form part of the 
Europe 2020 headline targets, which are: 
- a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (30% if the conditions are right); 
- a 20% share of renewable energy sources in final energy consumption; and 
- a 20% improvement in energy efficiency. 
The focus of the European Commission’s flagship initiative on resource efficiency and 
more sustainable technologies is reflected in the different communications outlining 
strategies for the research, economic and industrial policies focusing on green 
technology development (European Commission, 2012b and 2012c).  
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The Resource-efficient Europe initiative is supported by the 2012 Employment Package 
(European Commission, 2012d) regarding the link between green growth and jobs. It is 
detailed in the next section. 
1.2 The green jobs approach 
As explained above, in Europe, a first mention of the employment benefits of opting 
for sustainable development can be found in the 1993 White Paper (European 
Commission, 1993); the first sentence combines the concept of sustainable development 
with the needs of international competition and job creation.3 The underlying logic of 
green growth (creation of jobs through environmental protection-related activities) is 
already included.4 
The link between green growth and jobs was recently reinforced in the 2012 
Employment Package (European Commission, 2012d), which the European 
Commission introduced to support the Europe 2020 strategy’s flagship initiatives, 
through synergies between employment and the sectors tackled by the initiatives. “The 
changeover to a green, low carbon and resource-efficient economy” is one of the 
“longer term structural transformations” that reshape economic activities in Europe 
and thus affect the labour market (European Commission, 2012d: 2). 
In an accompanying document to the 2012 Employment Package (European 
Commission, 2012e), the Commission defines green jobs as “jobs that depend on the 
environment or are created, substituted or redefined (in terms of skills sets, work 
methods, profiles greened, etc.) in the transition process towards a greener economy” 
(European Commission, 2012e: 4). 
However, there is currently no commonly agreed definition of green jobs. The 
definitions proposed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) are the most quoted: 
- ILO: Jobs are green when they help reduce negative environmental impact, 
ultimately leading to environmentally, economically and socially sustainable 
enterprises and economies (ILO, 2013). 
- UNEP: Green jobs are those that contribute appreciably to maintaining or restoring 
environmental quality and avoiding future damage to the Earth’s ecosystems 
(Renner et al., 2008: 35). 
A definition with moving boundaries, however, allows for different methodologies to 
estimate the number of green jobs, leading to difficulties in comparing the results of 
studies. Moreover, the use by ILO and UNEP of broad categories shows that it is 
difficult to classify green jobs at the individual level. Among other issues, it also raises 
the question of whether “brown jobs” in the value chain can be considered as green as 
long as they ultimately contribute to one of the purposes included in the definition (e.g. 
jobs in the steel industry that supply wind turbine manufacturers). This question, 
                                                   
3 “This White Paper sets out to foster debate and to assist decision-making at decentralised national 
or Community level - so as to lay the foundations for sustainable development of the European 
economies, thereby enabling them to withstand international competition while creating the millions 
of jobs that are needed” (European Commission, 1993: Preamble). 
4 “[...] several estimates agree that some three million new jobs could be created in the Community, 
covering local services, improvements in the quality of life and environmental protection” (European 
Commission, 1993: 20). 
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however, is outside the scope of this paper, which focuses on direct jobs only (i.e. not 
on jobs in the supply chain, see Section 3.1.1.1). 
2. A changing energy sector 
This chapter outlines the evolution of the energy sector in the context of socio-
ecological transitions. It gives an overview of past transitions and their impact on 
energy use, before describing the state of the current energy sector in Europe today 
with a focus on the power sector. Finally, the chapter analyses what kind of changes 
can be expected in the power sector as the “new” SET unfolds. 
2.1 Energy transitions 
The energy sector has been subject to substantial changes as societies have progressed 
from one socio-ecological regime to another. This section will give a brief overview of 
various socio-ecological regimes, past socio-ecological transitions from one such 
regime to another, as well as the implications of these transitions for energy use. 
As noted in the introduction, a regime is defined as “a specific fundamental pattern of 
interaction between (human) society and natural systems” (Fischer-Kowalski and 
Haberl, 2007). Historically, human societies have been organised within three socio-
ecological regimes: hunter-gatherers, the agrarian regime and the industrial regime 
(which can be divided into the coal-based industrial regime and the oil-based 
industrial regime). In addition, a post-industrial sustainability regime can be seen as a 
new fourth regime in the future (Behrens, 2011).  
Various socio-ecological regimes can coexist in different parts of the world. While only 
few hunter-gatherer societies/tribes still exist today, agrarian societies are more widely 
spread, particularly in some of the least developed countries (LDCs). The most 
common system of societal organisation is the industrial society with high levels 
energy and resource use. In fact, many countries are still in the process of 
industrialisation today (e.g. China, India, Turkey). Industrialisation is associated with a 
large number of environmental and societal challenges, including climate change, 
biodiversity loss, pollution of land and water bodies, etc. This may require a 
comprehensive change in the patterns of social organisation and culture, production 
and consumption as humanity progresses beyond the current industrial model 
towards a more sustainable society.  
Based on the distinction between different socio-ecological regimes, two grand 
historical regime changes, or socio-ecological transitions, have been described by 
Sieferle et al. (2006). The first was the Neolithic Revolution some 4,500-10,500 years 
ago, transforming hunter-gatherers into agrarian societies (Diamond and Bellwood, 
2003). Hunter-gatherers live off food and materials obtained from wild animals and 
plants. This regime is thus based on passive solar energy utilisation, i.e. humans do not 
actively interfere with ecosystems (or only to a very limited extent). With the transition 
to agrarian societies, humans progressively colonised terrestrial ecosystems with the 
aim to harvest food and feed for human reproduction. This kind of active solar energy 
utilisation allowed for a raise in annual per capita energy consumption, though at very 
high human labour inputs (up to 100% of the labour power of a population) (Fischer-
Kowalski et al., 2012). As shown in Figure 1 (albeit on the global scale), the main source 
of energy in this system is biomass, used both to generate thermal energy (e.g. through 
the combustion of wood) and mechanical energy (as food and feed for humans and 
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animals). In addition, wind and hydro power (i.e. wind mills and water wheels) play a 
limited role. 
Figure 1. Visualising transitions in global energy consumption by energy source, 1800-2008 
 
Source: adapted from Smil (2010). 
The second major regime change was the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, in which agrarian societies were transformed into industrial societies. The 
key of this regime change was the transition from solar energy utilisation to fossil fuels, 
first coal and in the 20th century increasingly oil and gas (see Figure 1). This lifted the 
pressure on land as the limiting factor for the production of energy and food/feed. 
Indeed, Sieferle et al. (2006) note that unlike other fuels, fossil fuels were no longer in 
competition with other forms of land use and freed up large areas of land for 
agricultural production to feed growing populations. However, this positive effect of 
gaining independence from land as a limiting factor for energy production was 
accompanied by the negative effect of environmental externalities in the form of 
pollution and GHG emissions. Fischer-Kowalski and Hüttler (1999) give an overview 
of the main concerns related to the resource and energy use of contemporary industrial 
societies. These concerns mainly focus on the exhaustion of resources, pollution and 
the sheer scale of turnover and growth of the material and energy throughput of the 
socio-economic system (also due to the increasing role of emerging economies).  
Restructuring the industrial metabolism with the aim of reducing the pressures on the 
natural environment from societal activities will require yet another grand socio-
ecological regime change, geared towards the long-term sustainability of the society-
environment interaction (Behrens, 2011). It has therefore been defined as a transition 
“away from fossil fuels, towards solar and other low-carbon energy sources” (Fischer-
Kowalski et al., 2012). This will entail a substantial restructuring of the EU energy 
system, which is still largely based on fossil fuels, towards renewable energy sources 
and other low-carbon energy technologies. Behrens et al. (2013) have given an 
overview of what such a sustainability-based energy system may look like. However, 
as with previous transitions, the availability of new technologies will not be sufficient 
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to start the transformation process. Fundamental change can only be achieved if 
technology is able to achieve positive feedback with complementing technical, cultural, 
economic and social developments (Sieferle et al., 2006). 
The next subsections of this chapter will give an overview of the current EU energy 
system, and in particular of the power sector. This will be the picture of a mature, 
stabilised industrial society highly dependent on fossil fuels. Later on in this chapter, 
there will also be an assessment of how the power sector will need to change as the 
“new” socio-ecological transition unfolds. 
2.2 The current EU energy supply sector 
Before describing future trends in the EU energy supply sector, it is useful to give a 
brief account of its current state from the view of transition theory. Transition research 
has identified several theories or models of how socio-ecological transitions proceed. 
Historical analyses of such transitions suggest different phases. A typical model 
describing these phases is the S-curve, as shown in Figure 2. It describes four phases of 
a transition, starting from the pre-development phase, continuing to the take-off phase 
and, after an acceleration phase, settling into a stabilisation phase. Loorbach (2007) 
explains that there is little visible change other than experimentation in the pre-
development phase. In the take-off phase, the system begins to change, while it is the 
acceleration phase where “structural changes take place in a visible way through an 
accumulation of socio-cultural, economic, ecological and institutional changes” 
(Loorbach, 2007: 19). These changes eventually lead to a new equilibrium in the 
stabilisation phase, where the speed of societal change decreases. 
Figure 2. The four phases of a socio-ecological transition 
 
Source: adapted from Loorbach, 2007. 
According to this logic, most EU member states have reached the stabilisation phase of 
the industrial regime and are characterised by high but relatively constant levels of 
consumption. This is true in terms of both resource and energy consumption. 
According to Fischer-Kowalski et al. (2012), the shift from the acceleration phase to the 
stabilisation phase can be observed since the early 1970s and is closely linked to the oil 
crises in that decade. Equally, they find that signs of a new transition to sustainability 
are still sparse. 
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Figure 3 shows that both primary energy consumption and final energy consumption 
continued to increase since 1990 and reached an all-time high in 2006. Since then they 
have decreased, partly due to the economic crisis and partly due to energy efficiency 
measures. 
Figure 3. Development of primary energy consumption and final energy consumption in the 
EU27, 1990-2011 (Mtoe) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2013a). 
The EU remains one of the biggest energy-consuming regions in the world. In 2011, the 
EU member states were responsible for nearly 17% of global demand for primary 
energy (IEA, 2013) with total final energy consumption of the EU27 reaching 1,103 
Mtoe (Eurostat, 2013b). As illustrated by Table 2, the transport sector accounted for the 
largest share (33%) of total final energy consumption, followed by industry (26%) and 
the residential sector (25%). 
Table 2. Final energy consumption in the EU27 (2011 data) 
Sector Final energy consumption (Mtoe) Share of final energy consumption 
Transport 364 33% 
Industry 287 26% 
Residential 273 25% 
Services 141 13% 
Agriculture 24 2% 
Non-specific 14 1% 
Total 1,103 100% 
Source: Eurostat, 2013b. 
According to the European Commission (2013a), the power sector alone consumed the 
equivalent of 314 Mtoe, accounting for 26% of the EU’s final energy consumption. 
Power is thus a major component of EU energy consumption and demand for 
electricity increased substantially between 1990 and 2011. In 1990, electricity generation 
in the EU27 was at 2,586 TWh, rising to 3,280 TWh in 2011, representing a 27% increase 
over that period (European Commission, 2010, 2013a). The high dependence of 
electricity generation on fossil fuels is reflective of the industrial regime in its 
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stabilisation phase. In fact, the share of fossil fuels in gross electricity generation of the 
EU27 only decreased by about six percentage points, from 57% in 1990 to 50% in 2011.5 
While the role of coal (and oil) decreased to the benefit of gas over this period, coal 
remains the second largest source of electricity in 2011 (26%) after nuclear power (28%). 
Other sources of power generation are natural gas (22%), RES (21%) and oil products 
(2%). Figure 4 shows how the composition of the electricity mix shifted between 1990 
and 2011. 
Figure 4. Gross electricity generation in the EU27 by fuel (%) 
 
Sources: European Commission, 2010 and 2013a. 
Signs of a decarbonisation of the power sector are the increasing penetration of RES in 
the power mix. Hydro, wind power and biomass play the largest role, while solar, 
geothermal and other RES remained marginal in 2011. However, it should also be 
noted that the decline of the share of nuclear power has counterbalanced the GHG 
emissions reductions caused by an increasing share of RES to some (albeit limited) 
extent. Table 3 summarises the contribution of each fuel type to EU27 gross electricity 
generation in 2011. 
Table 3. Electricity production by source in the EU27 (2011 data) 
Fuel type Power production (in TWh) Share of total production 
Nuclear 906.8 28% 
Solid fuels  848.7 26% 
Gases 726.5 22% 
Oil products 73.6 2% 
Hydro 335.2 10% 
Wind 179.0 5% 
Biomass 132.6 4% 
Solar 46.3 1% 
Geothermal 5.9 0.2% 
Ocean 0.5 0.02% 
Total 3,279.6 100% 
Source: Eurostat, 2013b. 
In terms of structure, the EU power system is largely centralised. This means that 
large-scale and centralised power plants contribute the bulk of electricity generation. 
                                                   
5 The difference is due to rounding. 
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There are few electricity producers located close to consumers. In fact, adding the 
shares of nuclear, coal, gas, oil and (large) hydro shows that 88% of electricity in the EU 
was produced in large generation facilities in 2011. Through an interconnected grid, 
the electricity generated is transmitted and distributed to largely “passive” consumers 
with very little demand response. This centralised approach also has an influence on 
the structure of the electricity grid. The current power grid has been designed to 
mainly transmit single-direction flows from large-scale power generators, at a high 
voltage level, to consumers at a lower voltage level. It has not been designed to 
transmit a large amount of electricity in the opposite direction, i.e. from a low voltage 
level to a high voltage level. This is especially the case for the distribution grid. The 
centralised system grew historically because it offered a more cost-efficient way to 
satisfy the electricity demand, mainly because of economies of scale and better 
reliability (e.g. fewer blackouts). However, its high dependence on fossil fuels has 
raised environmental criticism and a transition towards a decentralised power system 
has already begun (Altmann et al., 2010). This transition can especially be observed in 
Germany. Here, decentralised solar photovoltaic systems have reached an installed 
capacity of more than 30 GW. This is comparable to about 30 nuclear power plants. 
As will be shown in the next section, a transition to a decentralised power system will 
facilitate the uptake of small, renewable generation capacity with a potentially positive 
effect on GHG emissions. Currently, however, high dependence on fossil fuels still 
causes electricity and heat production to contribute the largest share (37%) to CO2 
emissions in the EU, followed by transport (24%) and construction and manufacturing 
(15%) (IEA, 2012a). This underlines the importance of the power sector to 
decarbonisation of the EU economy in the context of a new socio-ecological transition 
towards sustainability. 
2.3 The future EU energy supply sector 
One of the main goals of current EU policy is the transformation of the European 
energy sector to a competitive low-carbon system. This is to be achieved within an 
overarching long-term objective of reducing EU GHG emissions by 80-95% by 2050 
(compared with 1990). 
There is a general consensus that RES will be a major driver for achieving this goal. On 
the policy level, the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive 2009/28/EC) sets a binding 
EU-wide target to increase the share of renewable energy in the EU’s total energy 
consumption to 20% by 2020. According to a proposal of the European Commission, 
this share should increase in the context of an EU-wide binding target to 27% by 2030 
(European Commission, 2014). This would result in an increase in the share of 
renewable energy in the electricity sector from 21% today to some 34% in 2020 and at 
least 45% in 2030. RES are thus likely to play an ever-increasing role in power 
generation (see also the scenario analysis by Behrens et al. (2013)), which may be an 
indication that the energy system is moving into the pre-development phase of the new 
SET towards sustainability. 
However, the current centralised generation paradigm is not likely to facilitate this 
transition. Although it could technically support large generation facilities producing 
low-carbon electricity based on coal with CCS, nuclear fission and – eventually, maybe 
– nuclear fusion, it is much more likely that a more distributed electricity generation 
system will develop, driven by the ongoing liberalisation of the EU electricity (and gas) 
market as well as by concerns over GHG emissions. The drive for increasingly 
decentralised generation is further enhanced by developments in distributed 
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generation technologies, constraints on the construction of new transmission lines, as 
well as increased customer demand for highly reliable electricity (IEA, 2002).  
Burger and Weinmann (2013) describe the changes in the energy mix, structure and 
ownership as an energy system trajectory (see Figure 5). According to their view, early 
civilisations collected wood and produced charcoal in a local setting. Their energy 
system was thus highly decentralised, private and largely carbon-free. With the 
depletion of forestry reserves and the introduction of the steam engine, coal replaced 
biomass as the most important energy source. Similarly, as the industrial revolution 
unfolded, larger power plants were needed for manufacturing and electricity 
provision. The rise of oil and gas in the second half of the 20th century further changed 
the energy system to an ever more centralised and public system based on fossil fuels. 
With the introduction of nuclear power plants and large hydro, economies of scale 
reached their peak in a highly centralised system, albeit with an increasing share of 
low-carbon fuels. This trend continues with climate change as the driving force behind 
the increasing penetration of wind and solar. However, these new RES flourish in an 
increasingly liberalised market setting where private investors build small-scale supply 
structures. Burger and Weinmann (2013) thus argue that the configuration of the 
energy system in the future could return to where it started: decentralised, carbon-free 
and privately owned. 
Figure 5. The energy system trajectory 
 
 Source: adapted from Burger and Weinmann (2013). 
Many definitions of distributed (or decentralised) generation exist, usually referring to 
small-scale generation units located close to the load. The EU “electricity directive” 
(2009/72/EC) defines distributed generation as generation plants connected to the 
distribution system. Ackermann et al. (2001) go a step further by also including electric 
power generation units connected directly to the network on the customer side of the 
meter. In practice, there is consensus that distributed generation units are connected to 
the distribution network, are not large-scale, have strong local dependencies (e.g. based 
on local RES), often generate power used by the producer, and are generally owned by 
relatively small actors on the electricity market (Altmann et al., 2010). These distributed 
power sources may also be connected to a “smart grid” linking several self-optimising 
micro-grids to ensure that supply matches demand at all times based on real-time 
information systems (Larsen and Sønderberg Petersen, 2005). 
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Some of the key benefits of such a decentralised system include higher electrical 
efficiency (by avoiding losses associated with transmission lines), lower variable and 
maintenance costs for certain technologies (e.g. wind and solar power), and possibly 
lower emissions through a higher share of RES. Moreover, a decentralised system 
offers the chance to let citizens participate in the local development and exercise more 
control over it. Investments in decentralised power generation technologies like wind 
and solar power are relatively small and can therefore be made by local residents or 
cooperative societies mainly owned by residents instead of big companies. In 
Germany, the number of newly created cooperative societies in the energy sector 
increased from eight per year in 2006 to 150 per year in 2012. In most cases, the share of 
private equity is very high, well above 50%. As of 2012, these energy cooperatives have 
invested €1,200 million in total (DGRV, 2013). 
However, the transition from a centralised to a decentralised/distributed system of 
generation will require substantial changes in network infrastructure. The current 
distribution grid was designed to transmit electricity from a high voltage level (where 
the generators are located) to a low voltage level (where the consumers are located). 
The increasing share of decentralised production will invert the direction of flows. To 
handle these events, the grid infrastructure needs to be upgraded. For example, more 
flexible local power transformers have to be installed to decouple voltage control for 
the low voltage system from the voltage control for the medium voltage grid (DENA, 
2012). In general, more grid services will have to be provided at a lower voltage level. 
Decentralised plants have to take over grid services such as frequency control and 
balancing, as these are currently provided by centralised power plants. This will 
require additional technology for both plant and grid monitoring. Finally, both local 
supply and local demand will have to become more flexible, through the use of smart 
meters operating in smart grids, for example (EPRI, 2011). In fact, over the whole 
energy system, it will be crucial to maintain the balance between supply and demand 
in electricity grids at all times, additional flexibility will be required in electricity 
systems to integrate variable renewable electricity generation (RES-E) into markets and 
grids. Additional flexibility of the power system will also be required due to demand 
variability and uncertainty, as well as general contingencies. The IEA describes power 
system flexibility as the “extent to which a power system can modify electricity 
production or consumption in response to variability, expected or otherwise. In other 
words, it expresses the capability of a power system to maintain reliable supply in the 
face of rapid and large imbalances, whatever the cause” (IEA, 2011a: 35). Providing 
sufficient power system flexibility will be a crucial aspect for the power sector to 
maintain security of supply in the context of decarbonisation. 
As shown in Figure 6, the need for more flexibility can be met by four flexible 
resources (IEA, 2012b): generation, demand response, storage and interconnections. 
Both centralised and distributed generation technologies can provide back-up capacity 
when RES-E supply is insufficient. In particular, open-cycle gas turbines (OCGTs) have 
relatively short start-up times (less than 20 minutes in the case of OCGTs) and can thus 
help balance supply and demand for power quickly when needed. Similarly, RES units 
can reduce power production in times of oversupply. On the demand side, load 
shifting and peak shaving can provide additional flexibility, provided that consumers 
have the right (price) information to adapt their behaviour where possible. In addition, 
energy storage technologies (e.g. pumped hydro, compressed air energy storage) can 
be used to decouple demand and supply. They can store power from variable RES 
when supply is too high and release it again as needed, thus contributing to balancing 
electrical energy and power. Finally, extending the grid can increase the flexibility of a 
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power system, as fluctuations in wind power production even out when connecting 
regions with different wind regimes. 
Figure 6. Overview of flexibility needs and resources 
 
Source: IEA, 2012b. 
A key feature of a future power system based on RES will be the rising levels of electric 
capacity to provide lower capacity factors of RES.6 In fact, Behrens et al. (2013) observe 
that all decarbonisation scenarios analysed in their study project an increase in 
installed electric capacity larger than the increase in power output. Their scenario 
analysis reveals that by 2020, EU electricity demand is projected to grow by 5-10% 
compared with 2010, while electrical capacity is projected to increase by 20-30% over 
the same time period. By 2050, electricity demand may have increased in the range of 
30-50% compared with 2010, while electric capacity could double by then (Behrens et 
al., 2013). The largest increase in electric capacity is projected in the European 
Commission’s High-RES scenario (see Chapter 3), which might require additions of 
170% by 2050 (compared with 2010). 
Figure 7 shows the average capacity factor of power plants, i.e. the ratio between actual 
full load hours and the total number of hours per year (8,760), for two scenarios 
published in the European Commission’s Energy Roadmap 2050 (the Diversified supply 
technologies scenario, and the High-RES scenario). Unsurprisingly, there is a 
downward trend in average capacity factors as the share of variable RES in total 
installed capacity increases (in particular, wind and solar). Moreover, there is an 
evident difference between the two scenarios after 2020. Due to the higher share of 
RES, the load factor is up to eight percentage points lower in the High-RES scenario. 
This means that, on average, power plants will run at full load for only 2,317 hours per 
year in 2050. Currently, the average full load hours approximately amount to 4,000.  
                                                   
6 As previously mentioned, wind and solar units are not dispatchable. Their generation (measured in 
watt-hours) depend on the availability of wind and solar radiation, which, in turn, depends on the 
location and the latitude of the plant. In Germany, solar photovoltaic units typically reach 1,000 full 
load hours. This means that a unit with an installed capacity of 10 kW will yield an annual electricity 
production of 10,000 kWh. For wind turbines, the full load hours range between 1,800 and 2,200. In 
contrast, dispatchable units like coal-fired power plants can reach much higher full load hours. 
Assuming a technical availability of 90% (due to maintenance and revisions), in theory values of up 
to 7,884 full load hours are technically feasible (based on a total of 8,760 hours per year). 
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Figure 7. Installed generation capacities (in GW) and capacity factors (in %) in 2020, 2030 and 
2050 
 
Source: European Commission, 2011a. 
To summarise, as the energy supply system becomes increasingly decarbonised, 
decentralised and privatised in the future, more capacity will be required but the 
utilisation of this capacity will decrease. The exact extent of increasing capacity and 
declining utilisation will depend on the availability of flexibility options. 
3. Effects on employment in the energy sector 
This chapter describes what the current and future features of the energy sector 
outlined in the last chapter might mean in terms of employment. It starts with the 
current employment situation in the EU’s energy supply sector and continues with an 
assessment of how employment levels and employment structure might develop as the 
energy sector continues to decarbonise through the years 2020, 2030 and 2050. 
3.1 Employment in the current EU energy supply sector 
Before assessing the impact of decarbonisation on the energy supply sector it is 
necessary to describe the status quo. Employment can be defined by the following 
characteristics: 
- employment levels; 
- employment structure; and 
- labour intensity. 
“Employment level” refers to the number of people employed in a sector. The 
“employment structure” of a sector is the distribution of workers over some selected 
qualitative variable (e.g. education level, occupation, gender, age). “Labour intensity” 
refers to the number of people involved in a production process per unit of output. In 
this section, the current employment characteristics of the EU energy supply sector are 
presented.  
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3.1.1 Employment levels 
3.1.1.1 Methodology and data sources 
In general, employment levels can be measured in three ways: direct employment, 
indirect employment, and induced employment. Direct employment figures use the 
primary activity to group employment levels. For example, direct employees in the 
wind industry are environmental engineers, manufacturing technicians, wind turbine 
installers, and so on. Indirect employment figures cover all jobs in the whole supply 
chain of the respective primary sector. For instance, a worker in the steel industry 
works indirectly for the wind industry if the produced steel is used to construct wind 
turbines. Finally, the jobs that result from the spending on goods and services by 
workers of the income generated by their primary activity are called “induced 
employment”. This study focuses on direct employment figures in order to assess the 
impact of decarbonisation on the power sector. Indirect or induced employment 
figures are less suitable because of limited data availability and the issue of correctly 
assigning jobs to specific technologies. As the effects of decarbonisation are typically 
grouped by technology, it is more straightforward to assign technologies to jobs using 
direct employment figures. For example, the increase of solar or wind power is a 
typical result of decarbonisation scenarios. This figure can then be related to jobs in 
solar or wind power. 
Eurostat provides three different statistical sets for direct employment figures: the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) (Eurostat, 2013c), Structural Business Statistics (SBS) 
(Eurostat, 2013d) and national accounts (Eurostat, 2013e). Data in the LFS originate 
from European private households and cover employment, unemployment and 
inactivity. The LFS is the only module in Eurostat exclusively dedicated to the labour 
market. Data in SBS come from enterprises and cover business activities in industry, 
construction, trade and services.7 National accounts come from member states and are 
compiled by Eurostat. They are not used in this study, because the categories are 
highly aggregated for the energy sector and data is incomplete. 
Complete data in Eurostat’s SBS are only provided until 2009. Incomplete data for 2010 
and 2011 in SBS tables are thus substituted with estimates from DG Energy published 
in the last edition of the EU Energy in Figures: Statistical Pocketbook (European 
Commission, 2013a). 
In order to calculate future employment levels, job numbers per energy activity should 
ideally be provided at very low levels of aggregation. Eurostat’s LFS figures are more 
aggregated than those provided by SBS and DG Energy, and thus provide a lower level 
of detail. However, SBS and DG Energy figures can be used to break down LFS figures 
to derive a higher level of disaggregation or a better resolution. An explanation of the 
use of SBS and DG Energy figures to disaggregate LFS data is provided in Annex 3. 
This allows for comparable results of DG Energy estimates and LFS data. 
The following categories in NACE Rev. 2 – the most recent version of the classification 
system of economic activities of Eurostat – are relevant to the energy sector (European 
Commission, 2008): 
                                                   
7 Due to the difference in methodology, figures in the LFS are generally higher than in SBS. In this 
report, data from the LFS forms the high end of employment ranges, while data from SBS forms the 
low end. 
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- B05 Mining of coal and lignite: “extraction of solid mineral fuels through 
underground or open-cast mining” and “operations leading to a marketable 
product” (e.g. grading, cleaning, compressing) (European Commission, 2008: 
106). 
- B06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas: including “the production of 
crude petroleum, the mining and extraction of oil from oil shale and oil sands 
and the production of natural gas and recovery of hydrocarbon liquids, [...] the 
activities of operating and/or developing oil and gas field properties” (European 
Commission, 2008: 107). This category excludes oil and gas field services, oil and 
gas well exploration, test drilling and boring (see B09.1); this category is further 
divided in two groups: 
o B06.1 Extraction of crude petroleum: excluding the refining of petroleum 
products (see C19.2); and 
o B06.2 Extraction of natural gas. 
- B07.21 Mining of uranium and thorium ores:8 “mining of ores chiefly valued for 
uranium and thorium content [...]; concentration of such ores; manufacture of 
yellowcake”9 (European Commission, 2008: 108); excluding enrichment activities. 
- B08.92 Extraction of peat: peat digging and preparation of peat for transport and 
storage purposes (European Commission, 2008); manufacture of peat briquettes 
is included in C19.2. 
- B09.1 Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction: “oil and gas 
extraction service activities provided on a fee or contract basis” (European 
Commission, 2008: 111) (e.g. exploration, directional drilling and redrilling, test 
drilling, liquefaction and regasification of gas for transport, draining and 
pumping services). 
- C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products: “transformation of 
crude petroleum and coal into usable products” (European Commission, 2008: 
138). This concerns mainly oil refining; this category is further divided in two 
groups: 
o C19.1 Manufacture of coke oven products: operation of coke ovens; 
production of coke and semi-coke, pitch and pitch coke, coke oven gas, crude 
coal and lignite tars; agglomeration of coke; and 
o C19.2 Manufacture of refined petroleum products: “manufacture of liquid or 
gaseous fuels or other products from crude petroleum, bituminous minerals 
or their fractionation products” (European Commission, 2008: 139); also 
including the manufacture of peat briquettes and hard-coal and lignite fuel 
briquettes. 
- D35.1 Electric power generation, transmission and distribution: “generation of 
bulk electric power, transmission from generating facilities to distribution centres 
and distribution to end users” (European Commission, 2008: 202); also including 
the trade of electricity; excluding power generated through the incineration of 
waste. 
                                                   
8 That class is part of the energy sector but no data on employment is available on Eurostat. It will 
not be mentioned further in this study. 
9 Yellowcake is the fuel used in nuclear power plants. 
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- D35.2 Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains: 
“manufacture of gas and the distribution of natural or synthetic gas to the 
consumer through a system of mains” (European Commission, 2008: 202); also 
including the trade of gas; excluding the manufacture of industrial gases and 
long-distance transportation of gas through pipelines.10 
This classification will be used in the next sections, as well as in the case studies. Based 
on this classification, Table 4 summarises key stages of supply side energy flows that 
are reflected in the analysis and a few which were not possible to take into account.  
Table 4. Key stages of supply side energy flows included in the NACE Rev. 2 categories used in 
this paper  
Activity Included Not included 
Coal and 
lignite 
Domestic EU extraction Extraction outside EU 
  Transport from extraction 
site to processing site 
 Processing of both domestic and 
imported volumes (e.g. cleaning, sizing, 
compressing, etc.) 
 
 Manufacture of coke oven products  
 Manufacture of briquettes  
  Transportation of products to 
end users 
Oil Exploration   
 Drilling  
 Development and operation of oil fields  
 Domestic EU extraction Extraction outside EU 
  Operation of pipelines 
  Shipment from extraction site 
 Refining of both domestic and imported 
volumes (including the recovery of 
hydrocarbon liquids) 
 
  Distribution of refined 
products to end users 
Natural gas Exploration   
 Drilling  
 Development and operation of gas fields  
 Domestic EU production Production outside EU 
  Operation of pipelines 
                                                   
10 D35.1 “Electric power generation, transmission and distribution” and D35.2 “Manufacture of gas; 
distribution of gaseous fuels through mains” are two groups that are part of the division D35 
“Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply” in NACE. Group D35.3 “Steam and air 
conditioning supply” is not considered part of the energy sector in this study. The reasons are that it 
includes activities such as the production and distribution of cooled air, the production and 
distribution of chilled water for cooling purposes, and the production of ice, for food and non-food 
purposes (European Commission, 2008), which do not have the supply of energy as their main 
purpose. Moreover, it is not technology-specific, i.e. it is not relevant for the transition to low-carbon 
technologies for energy supply. 
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  Shipment from production 
site 
 Manufacture of gas Manufacture of industrial 
gases 
  Long-distance transportation 
through pipelines 
 Distribution of gas to final users  
 Trade of gas to final users  
Electricity 
(incl. RES) 
Production of electricity in the EU Production of electricity 
through the incineration of 
waste 
 Transmission of electricity  
 Distribution of electricity  
 Trade of electricity  
Source: based on European Commission, 2008. 
Table 4 shows that the above-mentioned NACE Rev. 2 categories include most stages 
of the energy flow, however data by individual stage (i.e. extraction, processing, 
conversion, transport, distribution, etc.) are not always available. In some instances, 
data are provided at high levels of aggregation (i.e. some of the above categories may 
be summarised into more aggregated categories). In these cases, the codes of the 
relevant categories will be provided in tables (where possible) to improve transparency 
(see, for example, Table 5). 
3.1.1.2 Results 
The total number of direct jobs provided by the EU energy sector in 2011 is estimated 
at between 1.5 million (DG Energy) and 2.2 million (Eurostat, LFS), representing a 
share of 0.7-1% of the total employed workforce in that year. DG Energy estimates and 
LFS data provide the low and high ends of the range, respectively, of employment 
levels summarised in Table 5. DG Energy and LFS data are roughly confirmed by 
estimates of industry associations.11 There is a certain level of inaccuracy, because some 
industry estimates of direct jobs are derived from estimates that also include indirect 
jobs. Table 5 presents the range of employment levels resulting from the figures 
presented above. It shows that electric power generation, transmission and distribution 
(summarised in the category “electricity”) is by far the largest employer, providing for 
roughly 55-60% of all direct jobs in the energy sector. The extraction of primary fossil 
fuels employs less than a quarter of all direct jobs, while other oil and gas activities 
(including oil refining, manufacture and distribution of gas) provide less than 20%. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
11 See the list of industry associations in Annex 2. Given the role of associations of representing the 
interests of their members, their figures may be biased in favour of the represented industry. This is 
the reason why industry associations’ figures are balanced against Eurostat data in this report. 
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Table 5. Direct employment in the energy sector, 2011 
Activity Range  DG Energy LFS Industry 
Mining of coal and lignite 
[B05] 
229,000 – 345,000 229,401 345,000 238,20012 
Oil and gas extraction13 
[B06 + B09.1] 
113,000 – 187,000 113,171 186,939 91,76514 
Oil and gas other 
activities15 [C19.2 + D35.2] 
269,000 – 410,000 269,236 410,477 564,98516 
Electricity 
[D35.1] 
888,000 – 1,221,000 888,358 1,221,148 1,100,00017 
Other18 [B08.92 + C19.1] 21,000 – 27,000 20,593 26,669 n. a. 
Total 1,500,000 – 2,200,000  1,520,759 2,190,233 1,994,950 
Sources: European Commission (2013a); Eurostat (2013c, 2013d); industry associations.  
 
3.1.2 Employment structure 
3.1.2.1 Methodology and data sources 
The employment structure of the energy sector can be assessed in terms of occupation 
type or education level. For an analysis of occupation types, jobs in an establishment, 
industry or country are organised in a clearly defined set of groups according to the 
tasks and duties undertaken (ILO, 2012). An analysis of educational levels, on the other 
hand, refers to the educational attainment of the labour force and thus to its levels and 
distribution of the knowledge and skills base. 
For the purpose of this paper, education levels are preferred over occupation types 
because the latter may not provide sufficient information about the structure of 
education levels in the sector. For example, an occupational classification (e.g. 
managers) may include workers with different levels of education (a manager of an 
SME, for example, may have a low, medium or high level of education). In this chapter, 
the structure of employment is thus presented following the approach based on 
education level. This is in line with the purpose of the paper, which is to assess 
whether the transition to a low-carbon energy system in Europe causes a shift in the 
required levels of education of the labour force. 
                                                   
12 For 2012 (Euracoal, 2013). 
13 Oil and gas are aggregated to reflect the nature of the production fields, which most of the time 
produce both oil and gas. Figures from DG Energy and LFS include jobs in extraction and in support 
activities to extraction. 
14 Derived from unpublished data obtained during interview with OGP expert (2013). 
15 Other activities in oil include refining and marketing, and other activities in gas include 
manufacture of gas, distribution of gas, and trade of gas through mains. 
16 285,256 jobs in oil, derived from 534 million hours worked in the downstream oil sector in 2012 
(Burton and den Haan, 2013), assuming that people worked 36 hours per week; 279,729 jobs in gas 
(Eurogas, 2012).  
17 Estimation based on Eurelectric data (Eurelectric, 2012). An explanation of this estimate is 
provided in Annex 4. The estimate includes people employed in all power generation sources; it may 
double count workers that are already included in figures for employment in fossil fuels. 
18 Manufacture of coke oven products, and extraction of peat. 
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A common classification of education levels is the International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED) developed by UNESCO. In this classification, education 
programmes are grouped in levels of education following their degree of complexity 
and specialisation (UNESCO-UIS, 2012). Education levels can then be linked to broader 
qualification levels. Table 6 shows the relationship between levels of education in the 
1997 version of ISCED19 and levels of qualification used by Cedefop.20 
Table 6. Relationship between Cedefop levels of qualification and ISCED levels of education 
Qualification level 
(Cedefop) 
ISCED-97 
Low 1 Primary education or first stage of basic education 
 2 Lower secondary education or second stage of 
basic education 
 3C Programmes of short duration not designed to 
lead to ISCED 5 
Medium 3 – excl. 3C Upper secondary education 
 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
High 5 First stage of tertiary education 
 6 Second stage of tertiary education 
Source: Cedefop, 2012a.  
The three levels of qualification used by Cedefop range from low, to medium, to high 
education levels. The qualification level of a worker is defined as the highest education 
level obtained (Cedefop, 2012a). This classification corresponds to six ISCED levels of 
education, ranging from primary education to second stage of tertiary education. In the 
following sections of this paper, we will refer to Cedefop’s classification. 
3.1.2.2 Results 
The results on the current employment structure will be presented in two parts. First 
for the entire EU energy supply sector, which implicitly includes RES in the power 
sector, and then specifically for the renewable energy sector, thus reflecting the 
importance of that sector in the new SET away from fossil fuels. 
The EU energy supply sector 
The Skills Forecasts online database of Cedefop (2013) provides estimations for the 
number of low, medium and highly qualified workers per energy activity. Table 7 
presents Cedefop results for qualifications in the energy sector.21 
 
 
                                                   
19 ISCED was revised in 2011, but sources for this study use the 1997 version. 
20 Cedefop is the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training. 
21 Cedefop’s breakdown of activities is based on NACE Rev. 1.1, a previous version of NACE that 
differs slightly from the description of the energy sector based on NACE Rev. 2 (see section 3.1.1.1). 
Codes in brackets indicate the NACE Rev. 2 categories covered by Cedefop activities. 
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Table 7. Structure of qualification levels in the energy sector, 2012 (%) 
Activities Low-qualified Medium qualified Highly qualified 
Mining of coal and lignite 
[B05 + B08.92] 
10 75 15 
Oil and gas extraction 
[B06 + B09.1 + part of B07.21] 22 
11 47 42 
Manufactured fuels 
[C19 + part of B07.21] 23 
11 46 43 
Electricity, steam and hot water 
supply24 [D35.1] 
8 55 37 
Manufacture of gas and distribution 
through mains [D35.2] 
7 60 33 
Source: Cedefop, 2013. 
According to this data, oil and gas extraction and the manufacture of fuels have the 
highest share of highly qualified workers. However, the distribution of levels of 
qualification is roughly similar for all energy activities, with the exception of coal and 
lignite mining activities, which employ by far the lowest share of highly qualified 
workers. More generally, around 10% of the labour force employed in the energy 
sector in 2012 were low-qualified, around 50-60% were medium qualified and around 
40% were highly qualified. 
Compared with the average of the overall EU economy, the energy sector employs a 
relatively higher-qualified labour force. Indeed, when taking into account all economic 
sectors of the EU in 2012, 22% of the labour force was low-qualified, 48% medium 
qualified, and 30% highly qualified (Cedefop, 2013). 
The renewable energy sector 
Given the increasing share of RES in power generation projected in most 
decarbonisation scenarios, the employment structure of the renewable energy sector is 
analysed in more detail in this section.25 
In general, recent studies indicate that the renewables sector employs a relatively high 
share of highly qualified workers. Lehr and O’Sullivan (2009) surveyed renewable 
energy sector companies in Germany in 2007-2008 and show that one third of the 
labour force in the sector holds high-level qualifications. The Observatory for 
Sustainability in Spain surveyed companies of the renewable energy sector in Spain in 
2009 and find that 50% of the sector’s workforce has a tertiary degree (Jimenéz Herrero 
and Leiva, 2010). A third study, RenewableUK (2013), focuses on the wind and marine 
energy sector in the UK. Based on a survey of companies in the sector in 2013, it shows 
                                                   
22 The part of B07.21 that is included is the mining of uranium and thorium ores (Cedefop, 2012a).  
23 The part of B07.21 that is included is the manufacturing of nuclear fuel (Cedefop, 2012a). 
24 Aggregated by Cedefop (Cedefop, 2012a). 
25 A difficulty in analysing the employment structure of the renewable energy sector is the significant 
share of workers that acquires qualifications through vocational education and training (VET). VET 
does not correspond to a level of education of the ISCED scale in particular. In ISCED-97, VET is 
found under levels 2 “Lower secondary education”, 3 “Upper secondary education”, and 4 “Post-
secondary non-tertiary education”. The 2011 revision of ISCED also includes “advanced VET” in 
levels 5 and 6 of education (see also Table 6). 
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that 43% of the people employed in the UK wind and marine energy industries are 
highly qualified. Table 8 summarises the results of the three studies. 
Table 8. Structure of qualification levels in the renewable energy sector in Germany, Spain and 
the UK (%) 
Study Medium and low- 
qualified 
Highly qualified 
Germany (all RES, 2007/2008)26 54 33 
Spain (all RES, 2009) 50 50 
United Kingdom (wind and marine energy, 2013) 27 16 75 
Sources: Jimenéz Herrero and Leiva (2010); Lehr and O’Sullivan (2009); RenewableUK (2013). 
These studies indicate that the share of highly qualified workers employed in the 
renewable energy sector is substantially higher than in coal mining (33-75% in the 
renewables sector compared with 15% in coal and lignite mining activities). In a 
scenario in which fossil fuel-based power generation would be mainly replaced by 
RES-E after 2020, the hypothesis is that low and medium qualified jobs in coal mining 
may be replaced by highly qualified jobs in RES. 
3.1.3 Labour intensity of various activities  
This section defines the number of jobs per unit of energy for different energy 
activities. A distinction is made between the “primary energy sector” and “power 
generation”. This distinction reflects the difference in activities.  
Activities in the primary energy sector include the mining, refining, manufacturing 
and distribution of fossil fuels. For renewables, a relevant activity in primary fuels 
would be the manufacturing and distribution of biomass and biogas. However, 
separate employment data availability for these activities is scarce, which is why we 
focus on employment in power generation for biomass and biogas. For other 
renewable energy technologies like wind and solar, there are no activities in primary 
fuels simply because no combustibles are required to produce electricity.28 For nuclear, 
relevant activities in the primary sector include the mining, treatment and 
manufacturing of uranium. Again, there is a lack of separate employment figures for 
these activities, which is why nuclear is disregarded for the primary energy sector.29 
Power generation includes activities related to the construction, operation and 
maintenance of a power plant – be it renewable or conventional. 
Labour intensity in the primary energy sector is expressed in jobs per unit of volume of 
energy that is supplied. Labour intensity in the power sector is expressed in jobs per 
unit of electric installed capacity.30 
                                                   
26 The shares of low, medium, and highly qualified workers do not sum to 100%. This is because 14% 
of the study’s sample gave “no response”. 
27 The remaining 9% have other types of qualifications. 
28 The issue is thus not related to the conversion of produced electricity into primary energy. There 
are simply no activities related to the treatment of wind or solar energy. 
29 Due to the high energy density of nuclear fuels, the number of jobs per primary energy provided is 
relatively low. 
30 There might be double counting of jobs in primary activities of fossil fuels in the primary energy 
sector and in the power sector. For instance, jobs in coal mining are counted in coal as a primary fuel, 
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3.1.3.1 Methodology and data sources 
Labour intensity in the primary energy sector is calculated by relating the number of 
jobs to the volumes of energy that are supplied (in ktoe). Employment in extraction 
activities – mining of solid fuels and extraction of oil and gas – refers to primary energy 
produced domestically in the EU (i.e. excluding imports). Employment in the refining, 
manufacturing, and distribution of fuels concerns the (domestic) processing of both 
domestic production and imported volumes.31 
Labour intensity in the power sector is calculated by relating the number of jobs to the 
electric capacity installed in the EU (in MW). 
The two labour intensity ratios defined for primary energy activities and for the power 
sector in this section are equivalent to the employment factors used in the calculations 
for future employment in Section 3.2.2 (and in the case studies in Annex 1). 
3.1.3.2 Results 
Table 9 presents the labour intensity of primary energy activities. Figures for direct jobs 
are based on Table 5 (see Section 3.1.1.2). 
Table 9 shows that the mining of solid fuels is the most labour-intensive activity. As 
noted above, this figure only refers to mining activities within the EU’s borders. The 
(domestic) extraction of oil and gas is much less labour intensive, though still twice as 
labour intensive as activities related to the processing of (both domestically produced 
and imported) oil and gas. 
Table 9. Labour intensity of primary energy activities in 2011, jobs/ktoe 
Activity Jobs/ktoe Direct jobs ktoe 
Mining of coal and lignite [B05] 1.37 – 2.06 229,000 – 345,000 167,40032 
Oil and gas extraction [B06 + B09.1] 0.49 – 0.81 113,000 – 187,000 229,80033 
Oil and gas other activities [C19.2 + D35.2] 0.27 – 0.41 269,000 – 410,000 1,004,60034 
Source: own calculations based on European Commission (2013a); Eurostat (2013c, 2013d). 
Given the projected increasing electrification of the EU economy, notably by 2050, and 
increasing levels of power generation from RES, this study analyses the power sector in 
detail.  
Table 10 shows the labour intensity of different power generation sources.35 
                                                                                                                                                     
but also in coal as a power generation source, because the entire value chain of power generation 
sources is taken into account (see Section 3.1.3.2). However, as employment factors used in 
calculations of future employment are based on current employment levels, where potential double 
counting is also included, calculations of future employment in 2020, 2030 and 2050 remain 
proportional. 
31 Given EU import dependency levels for fossil fuels (85% for oil, 67% for gas, and 41% for solid 
fuels in 2011 (European Commission, 2013a)), not taking imported volumes into consideration would 
result in overstated ratios of jobs per unit of energy produced in the EU. 
32 Solid fuels production in 2011 (European Commission, 2013a). 
33 Production of petroleum and products, and gas and derived gases in 2011 (European Commission, 
2013a). 
34 Sum of oil and gas production and imports in 2011 (European Commission, 2013a), from which 
40,000 ktoe of imported refined products (gasoil and jet fuel) in 2011 are subtracted (Eurostat, 2013b). 
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Table 10. Labour intensity of power generation sources in 2010/2011 (jobs/MW)36 
 Jobs/MW Direct jobs MW37 
Solid fuels [B05 + C19.1] 1.47 – 2.11 244,000 – 350,000 165,700 
Gas [B06.2 + part of B09.1 + D35.2]38 1.21 – 1.69 200,000 – 279,000 165,048 
Nuclear 0.95 125,00039 132,071 
RES, including:  577,58140  
Biomass and waste41 8.22 198,330 24,134 
Small hydropower42 1.08 14,755 16,613 
Solar PV 2.35 120,436 51,274 
Wind 1.4543 136,490 94,099 
Source: own calculations, based on Eurelectric (2012); European Commission (2013a); Eurostat 
(2013c, 2013d); Liébard (2012). 
Table 10 shows that some RES, and in particular biomass and solar PV, are more labour 
intensive than fossil-based power generation. Wind power is in the same range, while 
small hydropower is (slightly) less labour intensive. 
The jobs taken into consideration in the calculation of employment factors for power 
generation sources cover the entire value chain. They thus include, for example, jobs in 
coal mining, in wind turbine manufacturing, and in fuel supply for biomass.44 The 
inclusion of jobs in fuel supply for bioenergy may explain the higher labour intensity 
compared with other RES. 
3.1.4 Conclusions 
Analysing Eurostat data and estimates of DG Energy and of industry associations 
shows that there were 1.5-2.2 million direct jobs in the energy sector as of 2011. With a 
corresponding share of up to 1% of the total employed labour force in the EU, the 
                                                                                                                                                     
35 Data for solid fuels and gas are for 2010, for all other power generation sources they are for 2011. 
The reason is that Eurostat data aggregates data on installed capacity for all combustible fuels, i.e. 
solid fuels, oil, gas, biomass and waste. Data on installed capacity for solid fuels and gas separately 
are available in Eurelectric (2012) for 2010. To ensure consistency of the ratio, job figures for solid 
fuels and gas are also for 2010. 
36 Note that figures refer to activities related both to the construction, installation and manufacturing 
(CIM) of power plants, as well as their operation and maintenance (O&M). 
37 Sources: Solid fuels and gas in 2010: Eurelectric (2012); Nuclear, wind, and biomass and waste in 
2011: European Commission (2013a); Small hydro and solar PV in 2011: Liébard (2012). 
38 The share of jobs related to gas only in category B09.1 “Support activities for petroleum and 
natural gas extraction” is equivalent to the share of B06.2 “Extraction of natural gas“ in B06 
“Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas“. 
39 Figure from Foratom (2010), see Annex 6. 
40 Estimation based on Liébard (2012), detailed in Annex 5. 
41 According to Eurostat, biomass and waste include wood and wood waste, biogas, municipal 
renewable solid waste, charcoal, and biofuels (European Commission, 2013a). Related job figures 
include jobs in agriculture, farming and forestry (Liébard, 2012). 
42 Small hydropower includes facilities with a maximum capacity of 10 MW (Liébard, 2012). 
43 Average figure for onshore and offshore wind. Offshore wind is estimated by the European Wind 
Energy Association (EWEA) to have a labour intensity 2.5-3 times higher than onshore wind (EWEA, 
2012). 
44 With the exception of nuclear power, for which employment figures do not take upstream 
activities into account. 
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energy sector employs fewer people than, for example, the agriculture, forestry and 
fishing sector (5.2%) or the information and communication sector (2.8%) (Eurostat, 
2013e). 
The energy sector shows a homogenous education structure, relying mostly on 
medium and highly qualified workers. Coal and lignite mining employs the lowest 
share of highly qualified workers. 
Regarding labour intensity, upstream activities in fossil fuels (mining of coal and 
lignite and the extraction of oil and gas) are almost twice as labour intensive as 
downstream activities (refining, manufacturing and distribution of fuels). It is 
uncertain whether replacing domestic fossil fuels with imported fuels leads to job 
losses. On the other hand, increasing employment may be expected by replacing 
imported fossil fuels with (domestic) RES. For power generation, RES tend to be 
somewhat more labour intensive than fossil fuels, depending on the source.  
Given the uncertainty associated with the input data and the fact that simplifying 
assumptions had to be made, these results are also subject to uncertainty and thus need 
to be treated with care. However, data by Wei et al. (2010) show a similar outcome.45  
The next section assesses the extent to which changes in the energy sector by 2020, 2030 
and 2050 will impact on employment, both in terms of job numbers and required 
qualification levels. 
3.2 Employment in the future EU energy supply sector 
In order to achieve the 2050 decarbonisation objectives of the European Commission, 
the EU energy supply sector will face fundamental changes during the next decades 
that will also affect employment levels and required qualification levels. In this chapter 
we assess the impact of decarbonisation on employment in the energy supply sector for 
the years 2020, 2030 and 2050. The analysis is based on two decarbonisation scenarios 
published in the Energy Roadmap 2050 of the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2011a), as well as on a reference scenario from the same publication. 
3.2.1 Scenarios for the future energy supply sector 
In its Energy Roadmap 2050, the Commission presents five decarbonisation scenarios 
based on five different combinations of low-carbon technologies (energy efficiency, 
diversified supply technologies, RES, nuclear, CCS). All of them allow a decrease in 
domestic EU GHG emissions by at least 80% compared with 1990. While the five 
decarbonisation scenarios are modelled on specific political priorities reflecting 
different societal preferences, their common emissions constraint allows for a 
comparison.  
Two of the above-mentioned decarbonisation scenarios are selected for the purpose of 
this analysis, namely the “Diversified supply technologies scenario” and the “High 
renewable energy sources scenario”. These two scenarios are compared with the 
baseline scenario of the Energy Roadmap 2050, also known as the “Reference scenario”. 
This section describes these three scenarios, as well as the reasons behind their 
selection.  
                                                   
45 Wei et al. (2010) calculate higher labour intensity ratios for RES than for other sources of US power 
generation (in job-years/GWh): biomass: 0.21; small hydro: 0.27; solar PV: 0.87; wind: 0.17; nuclear: 
0.14; coal: 0.11; natural gas: 0.11. 
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- Reference scenario (Ref): This scenario is based on the continuation of current 
economic and demographic trends. The “20-20-20” targets regarding GHG 
emissions reductions and RES deployment are achieved, but no future objectives 
are set beyond 2020. Sensitivities surrounding volatile prices of imported energy 
and concerns about economic growth are also taken into account. In this scenario, 
all investment decisions are determined by market forces, whereas technological 
progress is driven by policies enacted before March 2010. This scenario serves as 
baseline for the evaluation of the two decarbonisation scenarios selected for this 
analysis. 
- Diversified supply technologies scenario (DST): This scenario is neutral from a 
technological perspective. Decarbonisation is achieved by means of pricing 
carbon (i.e. an undefined proxy for policy measures that bring about emission 
reductions), which is applied to all sectors (ETS and non-ETS). The scenario 
assumes societal support (member states, investors, citizens) for nuclear energy 
(except for declared “nuclear sceptics” such as Germany), CCS and RES 
facilitation policies. This scenario is interesting to assess, as it encompasses the 
application of a wide range of low-carbon technologies without preference for a 
specific type of technology.  
- High renewable energy sources scenario (High-RES): The political ambition behind 
this scenario is to achieve a very high share of RES (97% of electricity 
consumption by 2050). Technologies deployed include wind (both on- and 
offshore), solar PV and concentrated solar power (CSP) and storage, increased 
uptake of heat pumps, etc. Given the key role of RES in achieving an effective 
reduction of CO2 emissions, scrutinising this decarbonisation scenario seems 
particularly important.   
Figure 8 shows that the contribution of primary (fossil) fuels to energy production 
decreases across all scenarios. In the Reference scenario, the use of primary (fossil) 
fuels decreases by 12% between 2011 and 2050. This trend is more pronounced in the 
two decarbonisation scenarios: -58% in the DST scenario, and -67% in the High-RES 
scenario (compared with 2011). While domestic production of fossil fuels decreases in 
all three scenarios, the main difference between the Reference scenario and the 
decarbonisation scenarios is the amount of oil imported, which is much higher in the 
former than in the latter, particularly in 2050.  
In all scenarios, solid fuels play a rather limited role throughout the period analysed. It 
is interesting to note that in the High-RES scenario, the EU gradually becomes a self-
sufficient producer of solid fuels. The reason for this is the low consumption of solid 
fuels in this scenario (accounting for 7% of all primary fuels in 2050). The contribution 
of gas remains fairly constant across all scenarios, yet its role increases as oil loses 
importance.  
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Figure 8. Energy supplied by primary fuels in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050 (Mtoe) 
 
Sources: European Commission (2011a, 2013a). 
Figure 9 presents the installed capacity of selected energy technologies for the three 
scenarios. Although the total level of installed capacity increases in all scenarios, the 
largest augmentation occurs in the High-RES scenario and is mainly driven by a large-
scale deployment of (variable) wind and solar energy. According to this scenario, in 
2050 the joint capacity of these two types of RES amounts to 1,587 GW, i.e. 73% of the 
total installed electric capacity in that year. Overall, in the High-RES scenario, the total 
installed capacity rises from 1,157 GW in 2020 to 2,166 GW in 2050 (+46%). A similar 
development can be observed in the DST scenario, albeit at lower levels than in the 
High-RES scenario. 
The total level of installed capacity increases with the share RES due to the intermittent 
nature of wind and solar technologies.46 The capacity factor of these technologies, i.e. 
the ratio of electricity generation and installed capacity, depends on the weather 
conditions and cannot be controlled. Therefore, more capacity is needed in the High-
RES scenario compared with the DST scenario to fully satisfy electricity demand (at all 
times) and to ensure the balance of the power system. 
                                                   
46 In the Energy Roadmap 2050, solar energy includes solar PV and solar thermal (including CSP). Data 
on solar PV and solar energy are used interchangeably in this study. The reason is that, in 2011, the 
installed capacity in solar PV was estimated at 51,274 MW (Liébard, 2012), which represents 98% of 
the 52,066 MW of installed capacity in solar energy reported by European Commission (2013a). 
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Figure 9. Installed capacity of energy technologies in the power sector in 2020, 2030 and 2050, 
(GW) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011a). 
Throughout the entire period analysed, investments in new capacities are projected to 
grow in all scenarios (see Figure 10).47 With the exception of the Reference scenario, 
wind and solar make up the bulk of new investments. In the two decarbonisation 
scenarios, approximately 200 GW of new installed capacity come from wind and solar 
technologies, accounting for about 60% of the total new installed capacity in 2020. The 
situation changes when extending the timeframe to 2050. In the DST scenario, the 
capacity of newly built wind and solar installations amounts to 463 GW, adding about 
75% of newly deployed capacity. In the High-RES scenario, wind and solar capacities 
expand by 817 GW, accounting for 86% of all newly installed capacity by 2050. In this 
scenario, all investments in nuclear energy are discontinued by the end of the 2030s.  
Compared with RES, investments in fossil fuel powered units play an inferior role. 
Estimates for 2020 are rather homogeneous; conventional power plants make up 
roughly 23-27% of all newly deployed capacity. However, in the long run their 
contribution varies across the scenarios. In the Reference scenario, the contribution of 
fossil-fuelled installations remains constant; in 2050, they amount to 26% of all newly 
installed capacity. In the High-RES scenario, newly built conventional units produce 84 
GW of electricity in 2050, representing a mere 9% of all newly installed capacity. A 
comparable trend appears in the DST scenario: by 2050, new fossil-powered plants 
                                                   
47 Projections for new capacity come from European Commission (2011a). However, they are 
available only for groups of technologies: “Renewable energy” covers wind, solar, and hydropower; 
“Thermal power fossil fuels“ include solid fuels, oil, and gas; and “Thermal power RES“ includes, 
among others, biomass. Projections for new capacity in each separate technology were calculated on 
the basis of the share of each technology in total installed capacity in 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050. 
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produce 95 GW of electricity. This corresponds to 15% of all newly installed capacity. 
The contribution of small-scale hydro is marginal across all the scenarios. 
Figure 10. New installed capacity of energy technologies in the power sector for 2011-2020, 
2021-2030, 2031-2040 and 2041-2050 (GW)48 
  
Source: based on European Commission (2011a). 
Conclusions 
As outlined in the above section, considerable changes can be expected both in the 
share of primary (fossil) fuels and in the power sector, which will become increasingly 
dependent on low-carbon technologies – and mainly RES. The degree of this 
transformation varies across scenarios. In the Reference scenario, fossil-fuelled and 
nuclear power installations preserve an important role in the power sector until 2050. 
In this scenario, primary fossil fuels continue to supply significant volumes of energy. 
In the DST scenario, conventional and nuclear generation starts losing ground in the 
2030s, as RES come online on a large scale. This development is even stronger in the 
High-RES scenario; in 2050, the power sector is dominated by RES, whereas the 
importance of fossil fuels is considerably reduced. 
3.2.2 Future employment levels 
This section assesses the future number of jobs in the energy sector in the three selected 
scenarios from the Energy Roadmap 2050 (one reference scenario and two 
decarbonisation scenarios). It distinguishes between primary fuels and the power 
sector, before drawing conclusions for the energy sector as a whole. 
The methodology chosen for the calculations is the “employment factor” methodology. 
It consists of multiplying energy units (i.e. ktoe or MW) by technology-specific 
                                                   
48 Figures include both additional capacity as well as the replacement of existing plants. 
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employment factors. The employment factors are equivalent to the labour intensity 
ratios presented in Section 3.1.3.2 and are expressed in jobs per ktoe for primary fuels 
and in jobs per MW for the power sector. The methodology of utilising employment 
factors for projecting future employment levels is used in several other studies on 
employment in the energy sector (e.g. Wei et al., 2010; Teske et al., 2012). 
3.2.2.1 Primary fuels 
Methodology 
The ratio of jobs per ktoe that has been derived from current energy sector figures (see 
Section 3.1.3.2) is used to calculate the number of jobs linked to the projected volumes 
of primary fuels in the Energy Roadmap 2050. As explained in Section 3.1.1, the job 
figures (direct employment levels) for primary fuels are derived from different sources, 
thus showing some variance. In order to account for this variance, we utilise the 
minimum and maximum employment levels linked to a fuel. Therefore, there is a 
lower and an upper range for the employment factors in fossil fuels, leading to a lower 
and upper range in results for the projected employment levels for each scenario. 
Results 
Overall, it is evident that employment related to primary fuels will decrease in all 
scenarios between 2011 and 2050 (see Table 11). Not surprisingly, employment will be 
most affected in the High-RES scenario and least affected in the Reference scenario, 
where fossil fuels will continue to play a substantial role through 2050. Moreover, 
substantial differences between the three scenarios begin to materialise only after 2020, 
as the targets for the current decade have already been set by the EU Climate and 
Energy Package. 
Concrete results by scenarios are presented below, starting with the Reference scenario. 
In order to improve readability of the section, we first focus only on the lower range of 
employment levels (see Figure 11).49 The full range of jobs is presented later in the 
summary of this section. 
Table 11. Direct employment in primary fuels in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050, lower range 
  Solids Oil extraction Oil refining Gas extraction Gas other  Total50 
2011 229,000 76,000 118,000 37,000 151,000 611,000 
20
20
 Ref 203,000 42,000 133,000 29,000 153,000 560,000 
DST 182,000 39,000 123,000 29,000 142,000 515,000 
RES 179,000 39,000 123,000 29,000 142,000 512,000 
20
30
 Ref 162,000 31,000 126,000 20,000 142,000 482,000 
DST 104,000 27,000 112,000 19,000 136,000 398,000 
RES 96,000 27,000 112,000 19,000 131,000 385,000 
20
50
 Ref 158,000 7,000 126,000 8,000 133,000 432,000 
DST 74,000 2,000 44,000 6,000 105,000 231,000 
RES 40,000 2,000 44,000 5,000 78,000 170,000 
Source: own calculations. 
                                                   
49 This does not imply any preference for the lower range over the upper range, but is only meant to 
improve readability. 
50 Totals may differ from the sum of all sources per row due to rounding. 
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Trends in the Reference scenario 
In the Reference scenario, the employment level related to primary (fossil) fuels 
decreases throughout the entire period from 2011 until 2050. Applying the lower range 
of employment factors results in a decrease from 611,000 jobs in 2011 to 560,000 jobs in 
2020, 482,000 in 2030 and 432,000 jobs in 2050. Compared with 2011, 8% of all jobs are 
lost by 2020, 21% by 2030 and 29% by 2050. To a large extent, these job losses are 
caused by the decreasing production of oil related to the depletion of domestic oil 
resources (-34,000 jobs by 2020, -45,000 jobs by 2030, and -69,000 jobs by 2050). A slight 
increase in jobs in oil refining (+8,000 jobs by 2030, constant thereafter) partly makes up 
for this loss. The other major source of job losses is the production of solid fuels, where 
some 26,000 jobs may be lost by 2020, 67,000 jobs by 2030 and 71,000 jobs by 2050. 
Similarly, employment will be reduced in gas extraction (-21% by 2020, -47% by 2030 
and -79% by 2050). As with oil, this is also related to the depletion of domestic 
resources. For other activities related to natural gas (e.g. transmission, distribution and 
processing of imports), the decline starts only after 2020. Moreover, it is significantly 
weaker compared with other activities, i.e. -12% by 2050, compared with 2011. 
Trends in the DST scenario 
Compared with the Reference scenario, the reduction in employment is stronger in the 
DST scenario because, in general, the share of energy supplied by primary fossil fuels 
declines more strongly in decarbonisation scenarios. Overall, the number of jobs 
decreases in every activity related to fossil fuels. By applying the lower range of 
employment factors, the following trend for total employment can be observed: it 
amounts to 515,000 in 2020 (-16% compared with 2011), 398,000 in 2030 (-35%) and 
231,000 in 2050 (-62%). While the job losses in oil production are on a similar level 
when compared with the Reference scenario, the decline of jobs in solid fuels 
production is roughly twice as high in the DST scenario. In the DST scenario, 47,000 
jobs in solid fuels production are lost by 2020, 125,000 jobs by 2030 and 155,000 jobs by 
2050. Unlike in the Reference scenario, there is no compensation for jobs lost in oil and 
coal production by increasing employment in oil refining in this scenario. To the 
contrary, the number of jobs in oil refining decreases by 5% by 2030, and by 63% by 
2050 compared with 2011. Regarding the decline of jobs in activities related to gas 
extraction, the differences with the Reference scenario are marginal. However, the 
decrease of jobs in downstream activities in the gas sector is stronger than in the 
Reference scenario: 10% of the jobs are lost by 2030, and 31% of the jobs are lost by 
2050. 
Trends in the High-RES scenario 
The High-RES scenario shows similar results to the DST scenario, i.e. a strong 
downward trend in all activities related to fossil fuels. Overall, the employment level 
decreases to 512,000 in 2020 (-16%), 385,000 in 2030 (-37%) and 170,000 in 2050 (-72%). 
The decline in activities is comparable to the DST scenario but stronger, especially after 
2030 and primarily in solid fuels production and gas downstream activities. In the 
High-RES scenario, 50,000 jobs in solid fuels production are lost by 2020, 133,000 by 
2030 and 189,000 by 2050. Similarly, the decrease in gas downstream activities amounts 
to 6% by 2020, 13% by 2030 and 48% by 2050. 
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Figure 11. Jobs in primary fuels in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050, lower range51 
 
Sources: own calculations, based on European Commission (2011a); Eurostat (2013d). 
 
Summary 
Taking into account all uncertainties related to the methodology and the available data, 
there is clear evidence that decarbonisation will lead to job losses in the primary fuels 
sector (see Table 12). Compared with current employment levels of between 611,000 
(lower range of labour intensities) and 943,000 (upper range of labour intensities), 
decarbonisation may destroy between 96,000 and 153,000 jobs by 2020, between 213,000 
and 350,000 jobs by 2030 and between 380,000 and 686,000 jobs by 2050, depending on 
the decarbonisation scenario and range chosen. Total employment in primary fuels 
may thus decrease to some 512,000-794,000 in 2020, 385,000-613,000 in 2030, and 
170,000-347,000 in 2050. Generally, employment in primary fuels in the decarbonisation 
scenarios seems to be lower than in the Reference scenario, pointing to the possibility 
of higher job losses in primary activities as the energy sector decarbonises. 
By 2020, there are only minor differences between the three scenarios, as the supplied 
volumes are roughly the same for all scenarios (and almost identical between DST and 
High-RES). By 2030, jobs in the DST scenario and the High-RES scenario evolve the 
same way (385,000-398,000 jobs with the low employment factor, 593,000-613,000 jobs 
with the high employment factor), while the employment level in the Reference 
scenario is higher at 482,000-741,000 jobs. As shown in Figure 11, it is primarily the 
number of jobs in solid fuels that decreases until 2030.52 By 2050, employment 
                                                   
51 The upper range shows higher absolute values but the proportions are the same as for the lower 
range. 
52 Domestic jobs in coal and lignite will only be lost if decarbonisation translates into a reduction of 
domestic solid fuel production rather than a reduction of imported fuels (or both). However, the 
numbers provided by the European Commission (2011a) clearly distinguish between domestic 
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decreases in all fuels and in all scenarios. The decrease is the strongest for oil 
production. The main difference between the DST and the High-RES scenarios in 2050 
is the lower number of jobs in coal mining and gas downstream activities in the High-
RES scenario. 
Table 12. Direct employment in primary fuels in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050 (million jobs) 
 2011 2020 2030 2050 
  Ref DST High-RES Ref DST High-RES Ref DST High-RES 
Lower 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 
Upper 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 
Source: own calculations. 
It is worth noting that employment in coal and lignite mining has been declining in the 
EU15 since at least 1995. In the EU15, the workforce in coal and lignite mining declined 
by two thirds between 2000 and 2012, decreasing from 154,300 workers53 to 56,20054 
(Eurostat, 2013c).55 This shows the strong decline of the coal industry in most 
industrialised European countries. This decline is less pronounced in the EU27: 
employment in mining of coal and lignite declined from 374,300 workers in 200756 to 
331,600 in 2012 (Eurostat, 2013c). This shows the more important role that coal plays in 
central and eastern European countries compared with the EU15. Growing 
mechanisation substituting for human labour is the main reason for the decrease in 
employment in solid fuels mining (Renner et al., 2008; Fischer-Kowalski et al., 2012). 
3.2.2.2 Power sector 
Methodology 
Similar to the methodology used for primary fuels, the ratio of jobs per MW of 
installed capacity derived from the current power sector (see Section 3.1.3.2) is used to 
calculate the number of jobs linked to the projected installed capacity in the Energy 
Roadmap 2050. 
Moreover, a distinction is made between the jobs in construction, installation, and 
manufacturing (CIM) and the jobs in operation and maintenance (O&M). Separate 
ratios are prepared for CIM and O&M jobs based on Liébard (2012) and Rutovitz and 
Harris (2012).57 Employment factors for O&M can be expressed in jobs per installed 
capacity (e.g. per megawatt), meaning that the employment is linked to existing power 
plants, i.e. a certain number of workers/employees is needed to operate and maintain 
an existing power plant for each year of operation. In contrast, CIM employment 
factors are typically expressed in job-years per installed capacity, as the whole process 
of construction, installation, and manufacturing is usually not linked to a specific year. 
                                                                                                                                                     
production and imports in the supply of solid fuels to 2050. Of course, rising domestic extraction 
costs might result in a further decrease of domestic extraction rather than imports, thus further 
increasing the number of jobs lost in solid fuels in the EU. 
53 Including workers in the extraction of peat. 
54 Excluding workers in the extraction of peat (about 12,000 (European Commission, 2013a)). The 
revision of NACE in 2008 separated the extraction of peat from coal and lignite mining. 
55 Data from the LFS, because SBS data for division B05 “Mining of coal and lignite” do not go back 
earlier than 2005. 
56 Year of the enlargement of the EU to 27 member states. 
57 The methodology used to calculate CIM and O&M ratios is explained in Annex 7. 
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In order to have comparable figures for both CIM and O&M jobs for a specific year, the 
job-years in CIM are distributed over the decade in which new power plants go online, 
i.e. they are divided by ten (see Annex 7 for a more detailed explanation).  
As in primary fuels, there is a lower and an upper range of employment factors for 
fossil fuels.58 This results from the range of employment levels for fossil fuels (see 
Section 3.1.1.2). 
Results 
Similar to the development in primary fuels, it is not surprising that employment 
related to electricity generated from fossil fuels will decrease in all scenarios between 
2011 and 2050. Moreover, the decline will be most visible in the High-RES scenario and 
less significant in the Reference scenario, where fossil fuels continue to be used in 
power generation through 2050. Substantial differences between the three scenarios 
begin to materialise only after 2020, as the targets for the current decade have already 
been set by the EU Climate and Energy Package. 
Concrete results by scenario are presented below. First, general trends will be 
presented with a focus on absolute figures and the distribution of jobs among CIM and 
O&M activities. Then the trends in the three scenarios are discussed in more detail and 
with a focus on the distribution of jobs over different power generation technologies. In 
order to improve readability of the section, the full range of employment levels is only 
presented in the tables summarising the results. In the text below, we focus only on the 
lower range of jobs. 
General trends 
Table 13 and Table 14 present the general trends for the lower employment factors, 
both in absolute terms and when comparing the two decarbonisation scenarios with 
the Reference scenario. Between 2011 and 2020, employment in the power sector is 
estimated to increase by about 900,000 jobs to a total of 1.8 million. There are only 
minor differences between the three selected scenarios, as the newly installed 
capacities are roughly the same for all selected scenarios. By 2030, employment may 
increase to 2 million jobs in the DST scenario and to 2.4 million in the High-RES 
scenario. Compared with the Reference scenario, there might thus be 200,000 more jobs 
in the DST scenario and 600,000 more jobs in the High-RES scenario. Although the 
calculations for 2050 contain a high degree of uncertainty,59 they show a further 
increase in the number of jobs to 3.2 million in the DST scenario and 5 million in the 
High-RES scenario. Compared with the Reference scenario, some 800,000 jobs may be 
created in the DST scenario and 2.6 million in the High-RES scenario, where 
employment is twice as high as in the Reference scenario. 
 
 
 
                                                   
58 It is worth noting that it was not possible to distinguish between CCS and conventional power 
plants regarding the employment factors, because there are no historical employment figures 
available for CCS power plants. In principle, it is reasonable to expect a similar number of jobs per 
MW of capacity, as a CCS power plant still remains a centralised power plant. 
59 The employment projections for 2050 are subject to higher uncertainty than projections for earlier 
years. This is essentially due to the assumption that jobs and (newly) installed capacity are correlated 
linearly.  
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Table 13. Direct employment in the power sector in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050 (million jobs) 
 2011 2020 2030 2050 
  Ref DST High-RES Ref DST High-RES Ref DST High-RES 
Lower 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.4 2.4 3.2 5.0 
Upper 1.2 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.6 3.4 5.2 
Source: own calculations. 
Table 14. Direct employment in the power sector in 2020, 2030 and 2050, difference to 
Reference scenario (million jobs) 
 2020 2030 2050 
 DST High-RES DST High-RES DST High-RES 
Lower range 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.8 2.6 
Upper range 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.8 2.6 
Source: own calculations. 
The increase in total employment is equally driven by CIM and O&M jobs, and the 
share of each in total jobs (about 60% for CIM and about 40% for O&M) remains 
roughly constant over the entire period until 2050. This is also reflected in Figure 12. 
This development is not surprising, as CIM jobs involved in the installation of new 
electrical capacity create new O&M jobs required for the operation and maintenance of 
these new capacities. 
Figure 12. Direct employment in the power sector: CIM and O&M jobs in 2011, 2020, 2030 
and 2050, lower range (million jobs)60 
 
Source: own calculations. 
It is worth noting that the average capacity factor of power plants decreases with an 
increasing share of RES. In the DST scenario, the average capacity factor decreases 
from 44% in 2010 to 39% in 2020, 35% in 2030, and to 33% in 2050. In the High-RES 
scenario, the average capacity factor amounts to 39% in 2020, to 31% in 2030 and to 
                                                   
60 The upper range shows higher absolute values, but the proportions are the same as for the lower 
range. 
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only 26% in 2050. This raises the question of the impacts of lower capacity factors on 
the number of O&M jobs.  
While it is subject to uncertainty how O&M activities will evolve to 2050, the current 
structure of O&M costs can be used as an indicator for the status quo of O&M activities, 
i.e. the extent to which these are linked to the utilisation of a power plant. A 
comparison of fixed and variable O&M costs of gas-fired power plants (European 
Climate Foundation, 2010) shows that variable O&M costs are significantly lower than 
fixed O&M costs. For example, a gas-fired power plant running for roughly 20% of a 
year has about 20 EUR/kW of fixed O&M costs and about 2 EUR/kW of variable O&M 
costs. It is therefore assumed that the number of persons needed to run a power plant 
remains stable, even if the utilisation of this unit decreases. 
However, such a massive increase in unused back-up capacity can be challenged from 
an efficiency point of view. The deployment of intermittent RES requires back-up 
capacities. Yet, if there are flexibility mechanisms like demand-side response, storage 
or better interconnections with adjacent markets, the amount of back-up capacities can 
be reduced. To activate these flexibility potentials, it is probably necessary to adapt the 
power market design in order to put a price on reliability and/or give a value to 
flexibility. 
The following paragraphs present the results by scenario and technology in more 
detail. Table 15 and Figure 13 show the lower range of results for the power sector (i.e. 
based on the lower range of employment factors).  
Table 15. Direct employment in the power sector in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050, lower range 
 Solids Gas Nuclear Biomass Hydro61 Wind Solar Total62 
2011 244,00063 200,00064 125,000 182,000 15,000 136,000 120,000 1,022,000 
20
20
 Ref 207,000 211,000 84,000 600,000 9,000 470,000 179,000 1,760,000 
DST 185,000 207,000 78,000 632,000 10,000 518,000 197,000 1,827,000 
RES 182,000 204,000 78,000 612,000 11,000 520,000 199,000 1,806,000 
20
30
 Ref 145,000 201,000 189,000 544,000 3,000 472,000 219,000 1,773,000 
DST 80,000 160,000 142,000 591,000 4,000 629,000 349,000 1,955,000 
RES 79,000 156,000 101,000 608,000 6,000 884,000 608,000 2,442,000 
20
50
 Ref 225,000 253,000 199,000 681,000 3,000 613,000 449,000 2,423,000 
DST 144,000 229,000 117,000 798,000 8,000 985,000 948,000 3,229,000 
RES 108,000 203,000 17,000 1,325,000 13,000 1,684,000 1,695,000 5,045,000 
Source: own calculations. 
Trends in the Reference scenario 
In the Reference scenario, employment in solid fuel based power generation shows a 
decrease by 2030 (-41% compared with 2010) and a recovery by 2050, where it reaches a 
similar level as in 2010 (see Table 15). The jobs related to activities in gas-fired power 
plants remain at the level of 2010 until 2030 and increase afterwards to 27% above 2010 
levels by 2050. The deployment of new nuclear power plants after 2020 results in a 
                                                   
61 Small-scale facilities only. 
62 Totals may differ from the sum of all sources per row due to rounding. 
63 2010 data. 
64 2010 data. 
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substantial increase in related employment by 2030 (+51% compared with 2011) but 
only small increases thereafter. Jobs related to RES-E will already capture a share of 
over 70% of total employment in the power sector by 2020. This share will then be 
more or less constant until 2050. Biomass, wind and solar power are the largest 
employers. While employment in wind and biomass will skyrocket by 2020 (+244% 
and +230%, respectively, compared with 2011), employment in solar power 
installations will only take off after 2030 (+272% by 2050 compared with 2011). 
Trends in the DST scenario 
Table 15 also shows that the DST scenario, a decarbonisation scenario, foresees a 
stronger shift of employment to RES than the Reference scenario, but a stronger shift to 
nuclear than the High-RES scenario. Consequently, employment in the coal sector 
decreases faster than in the Reference scenario by 2030 (-67% compared with 2010). 
Similar to the Reference scenario, it picks up after 2030 but stays far below the 
Reference scenario levels in 2050 (-41% compared with 2010). Employment related to 
gas-fired power plants increases slightly by 2020 (+3% compared with 2010), falls 
considerably by 2030 (-20% compared with 2010) and recovers afterwards to reach 14% 
above 2010 levels in 2050. A similar but less pronounced increase has been projected in 
the Reference scenario. Employment related to nuclear power plants is also projected 
to follow a similar pattern to that in the Reference scenario, but the increase after 2020 
is less pronounced by 2030 (+13% compared with 2011) and fades away completely 
afterwards to -6% by 2050 compared with 2011. Finally, employment in the RES-E 
related activities triples by 2020 (compared with 2011), mainly driven by wind and 
biomass. Employment in biomass stagnates thereafter. Further increases until 2030 are 
mainly driven by solar power. Between 2030 and 2050, employment in solar and wind 
drives total employment in RES, which reaches +504% by 2050 compared with 2011. 
Trends in the High-RES scenario 
Compared with the DST scenario, calculations for the High-RES scenario project a 
much stronger shift of employment from fossil-based power generation to RES, while 
employment in nuclear is almost phased out by 2050. As in the DST scenario, 68% of 
the jobs in coal-based generation disappear by 2030 in the High RES scenario, but the 
recovery afterwards is much slower in this case and by 2050, some 56% fewer people 
will be employed in this technology than in 2010. Developments in employment 
related to gas-fired power plants follow the same patterns as in the DST scenario until 
2030, but increases afterwards are much lower and employment in this technology 
only recovers to 2010 levels by 2050. In contrast to the other two scenarios above, there 
is only a very slight recovery of employment in the nuclear industry between 2020 and 
2030, while it collapses between 2030 and 2050 to reach -86% by 2050, compared with 
2011. Despite this decrease in jobs in fossil- and nuclear-based generation, the total 
employment level is the highest among all the selected scenarios. This is due to the 
increase in RES-based power generation. Similar to the other scenarios, these increases 
are mainly driven by wind and biomass until 2020. In the High-RES scenario, 
employment in biomass stagnates until 2030 but picks up considerably until 2050. After 
2030, solar power becomes an important employer, reaching the same level as 
employment in biomass by 2030 and as employment in wind power by 2050. Total 
employment in RES-E triples between 2011 and 2020, and increases by 365% by 2030 
and by 941% by 2050 (both compared with 2011).65 
                                                   
65 Results may be overestimated, because they do not take into account a possible decrease in labour 
intensity due to the maturing of (e.g. RES) technologies. 
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Figure 13. Direct employment in the power sector in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050, lower range 
(million jobs) 
 
Source: own calculations. 
Summary 
In contrast to primary fuels, the power sector is likely to create jobs. Compared with 
current employment levels of between 0.9 million (lower range of labour intensities) 
and 1.2 million (upper range of labour intensities), decarbonisation may create between 
800,000 and 900,000 additional jobs by 2020, between 900,000 and 1.6 million additional 
jobs by 2030, and between 2.2 and 4.1 million additional jobs by 2050, depending on the 
decarbonisation scenario and range chosen. The total number of jobs in the power 
sector could thus increase to between 1.8 and 2 million in 2020, between 2 and 2.5 
million in 2030, and between 3.2 and 5.2 million in 2050, depending on the 
decarbonisation scenario. Compared with the Reference scenario, this means 
additional jobs in the ranges of 32,000 to 55,000 in 2020, 138,000 to 669,000 in 2030 and 
800,000 to 2.6 million in 2050. 
Due to the political agreement on binding RES targets for 2020, substantial differences 
between the three scenarios only begin to materialise after 2020. By that year, between 
21-28% of jobs in the power sector are related to fossil fuels in the two decarbonisation 
scenarios, compared with 24-31% in the Reference scenario. The fastest decrease in the 
share of jobs linked to fossil fuels in power generation is in the High-RES case, where it 
declines to 10-13% in 2030 and 6-8% in 2050. In the DST scenario, the share only 
decreases to 12-17% by 2030 and 12-16% by 2050. Not surprisingly, the share of fossil 
fuel related jobs is the highest in the Reference scenario, where it is roughly constant at 
20-26% in 2030 and 2050. 
The share of RES-E related jobs, on the other hand, increases substantially in all 
scenarios, but by most in the High-RES scenario. In 2011, about 38-44% of all 
employees in the power sector worked in RES-E related activities. This share increases 
to 68-74% by 2020 in the two decarbonisations scenarios, and almost similarly to 65-
71% in the Reference scenario. While the share of RES-E jobs in the Reference scenario 
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stays more or less constant until 2050, it increases in the DST scenario to 77-80% in 2030 
and 81-85% in 2050. Higher shares are achieved in the High-RES scenario, with 83-86% 
in 2030 and 91-94% in 2050. In the High-RES scenario, almost all workers in the power 
sector will be involved in activities related to RES-E by 2050. 
3.2.2.3 Total energy sector 
A summary of the findings is listed in Table 16. It shows total employment in the 
energy sector for all scenarios, i.e. summing up employment in primary fuels and in 
the power sector, both for the lower range and for the upper range.  
Table 16. Direct employment in the energy sector in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050 (million jobs) 
  Ref. DST High-RES 
  2011 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 
Lower range 1.5 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.3 2.4 3.5 2.3 2.8 5.2 
Upper range 2.2 2.8 2.7 3.3 2.8 2.7 3.7 2.8 3.1 5.4 
Source: own calculations. 
The results presented in Table 16 show that decarbonisation in the context of a new 
SET can lead to substantial employment creation, particularly in the long term. 
Compared with current employment levels of about 1.5-2.2 million, decarbonisation 
may create up to 800,000 additional jobs in the energy system by 2020, up to 1.3 million 
additional jobs by 2030, and up to 3.7 million additional jobs by 2050, depending on the 
decarbonisation scenario and range chosen. While the results of the two 
decarbonisation scenarios are similar to the Reference scenario until 2020, differences 
begin to materialise by 2030, and in particular by 2050. However, as noted before, 
results for 2050 are subject to high uncertainty due to the linear approach (i.e. constant 
employment factors) in calculating job projections.  
The results clearly show that more jobs are created in the High-RES scenario than in 
any other scenario. In this scenario, there are up to 800,000 more jobs in 2020, 1.3 
million more jobs by 2030 and 3.7 million more jobs by 2050 (all compared with 2011). 
Comparing the results for the High-RES scenario with the Reference scenario shows 
that up to 500,000 additional jobs may be created in the context of a decarbonisation by 
2030, and possibly even up to 2.3 million additional jobs by 2050. In the DST scenario, 
there may be 100,000 more jobs by 2030 compared with the Reference scenario and 
600,000 additional jobs by 2050.  
Results in Table 16 are net results, that is, they take into account both job losses and job 
creation. However, the net effect of the transition to a low-carbon energy system on 
employment in the full economy will also depend on dimensions that are not covered 
by this study, i.e. indirect employment, and budget and substitution effects. Budget 
effects occur when households have more disposable income and spend it in 
consumer-related sectors, thereby fostering the creation of jobs in the economy. 
Substitution effects occur when spending more on one good or service displaces 
spending on another consumer-related sector, thereby having impacts on employment 
in the affected sectors (e.g. higher energy prices for consumers may displace spending 
on holidays). Indirect effects relate to parts of the value chain that are not covered by 
this study, e.g. jobs related to the manufacturing of power plants or the machines 
related to the manufacturing. These general equilibrium effects are not fully 
quantifiable, of course, and thus not part of this study. 
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Similarly, the results shown in Table 16 are based on constant employment factors, i.e. 
today’s employment factors are projected on future volumes of primary energy and on 
future installed capacities in the power sector. Disregarding any potential future 
reductions in labour intensity, this is done due to a lack of reliable information on how 
labour intensities might develop in the future for different energy technologies 
(especially in the long run until 2050). In essence, this means that future employment 
figures may be overestimated – by how much is uncertain. However, historical 
evidence (EurObserv’ER, 2013) shows a decrease in labour intensity of RES over the 
period 2008-2011 (the years for which employment figures are available). The highest 
reduction was achieved in solar PV, where labour intensity (direct employment) 
decreased by an average of 13% annually between 2008 and 2011. Labour intensity of 
wind power decreased by about 1% per year in the same timeframe. Finally, labour 
intensity of biomass and waste decreased by about 9% annually from 2009 to 2011. 
Further improvements are expected in the future. Rutovitz and Harris (2012) suggest 
that labour intensity in biomass could decrease by 1.1% annually between 2015 and 
2020, and afterwards by 0.7% annually until 2030. For wind onshore, the decrease may 
be 2.8% annually between 2015 and 2020, and 0.2% between 2020 and 2030. The 
decrease is stronger for wind offshore, where labour intensity could decline by 7.2% 
annually over the period 2015-2020, and by 4.5% annually between 2020 and 2030. 
Similar reduction rates are projected for solar PV, where labour intensity may decrease 
by 6.4% annually between 2015 and 2020, and by 4.9% annually between 2020 and 
2030. Given that these estimates are characterised by high uncertainty, this paper bases 
its calculations on constant employment factors of the year 2011. 
3.2.3 Future employment structure 
Overall, jobs that disappear in conventional energy sources are replaced with jobs in 
RES, for all levels of qualification. In decarbonisation scenarios, the amount of jobs 
created in RES increases the demand for a highly qualified workforce in the energy 
sector. 
In the Reference scenario, between 67,000 and 101,000 jobs are lost between 2011 and 
2030 in the mining of solid fuels, affecting mainly medium qualified workers (75% of 
the sector’s workforce). Additionally, there are losses of between 58,000 and 96,000 jobs 
in oil and gas extraction by 2030 (compared with 2011), affecting both medium and 
highly qualified workers (47% and 42% of the sector workforce, respectively, see Table 
7). This means that by 2030, between 77,500 and 121,000 medium qualified jobs may 
disappear, while between 24,000 and 40,000 highly qualified jobs may be lost in 
primary fuels. 
However, between 2010 and 2030 in the Reference scenario, close to 800,000 jobs are 
created in RES-E. Given the employment structure of the renewable energy sector, with 
a share of at least 33% of highly qualified workers (see Table 8), medium and highly 
qualified jobs lost in primary fuels are theoretically fully replaced by jobs in the 
renewable energy sector.  
In the DST and the High-RES scenarios, more jobs are lost in primary fuels than in the 
Reference scenario. On the other hand, the amount of jobs created in the RES sector is 
more significant. RES may not only maintain the distribution of qualification levels, but 
may actually increase the demand for highly qualified workers. Indeed, in 2030, there 
are about 100,000 more jobs in the DST scenario and 500,000 more jobs in the High-RES 
scenario than in the Reference scenario (lower range). Considering that the renewable 
energy sector has a higher share of highly qualified workers (33% to 75%) than most 
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activities in primary fuels (see Section 3.1.2.2), this results in a net increase of highly 
qualified workers. 
With the level of qualifications in the energy sector going up, there may be a risk of 
skills shortages. Indeed, as the share of highly qualified workers in the general labour 
market increases (Cedefop, 2011), the energy sector could be in competition with other 
sectors for the recruitment of a highly qualified workforce. In particular, shortages of 
engineers and technicians are common to the renewable energy sector (ILO and EU, 
2011). The problem can be traced back upstream, with a lack of qualified trainers for 
renewable technologies (ibid.). Fortunately, dynamics recently at play in the labour 
market ease the risk of skill shortages. First, an increase in the supply of highly skilled 
workforce is observed in the EU. The growth in supply of medium and highly skilled 
workforce is even expected to outpace the growth in demand for highly skilled 
workers (European Commission, 2011c). Second, the economic crisis has had a positive 
effect on skills shortages, by facilitating the filling of vacancies in some occupations 
(Cedefop, 2012b). Finally, certain existing skills are transferable to the renewable 
energy sector, with or without the need for retraining. Examples of portable skills 
include welding, surface treatment and outfitting skills in the oil and gas industry 
usable in the wind turbine sector (Cedefop, 2010a). Examples of upskilling include 
skills in the assembly and installation of parts for industrial operators and industry 
electricians to work as wind turbine operators (Cedefop, 2010b), as well as training on 
solar PV for electricians and roofers to work as solar PV installers and designers (ibid.).  
Another potential threat to a sufficiently large and skilled workforce comes from 
ageing. The trend of an ageing workforce is observed in the power sector, with workers 
aged 50 and over representing at least 40% of the workforce in one third of the 
companies surveyed by Poupard and Tarren (2011). A relatively old workforce carries 
the risk of not finding skilled labour market entrants to replace them when they retire. 
Summary 
As the employment level increases in both decarbonisation scenarios, the employment 
structure of the energy sector may shift to more highly qualified workers, particularly 
due to the relatively high level of qualification required in RES. This means that the 
energy sector will provide not only more jobs in the context of the new SET, but also 
better qualified ones. 
3.2.4 Regional implications 
Employment effects may not be homogenous throughout the EU due to regional 
characteristics of the energy system. The following paragraphs describe potential 
employment effects in three regions: central and eastern Europe, northern Europe and 
southern Europe. The analysis is based on the case studies on Poland, Sweden and 
Spain (see Annex 1), and is lead by the assumption that over time, EU economies will 
converge, leading labour productivity of energy technologies to converge as well. 
Convergence of productivity is discussed in NEUJOBS WP8 (D8.3) on “Regional 
disparities, ageing and territorial aspects of employment”. 
Central and eastern Europe is characterised by generally high shares of fossil fuels, 
especially solid fuels, in both the energy mix and the power mix. Table 17 summarises 
the shares of these fuels in gross inland consumption and in power generation in 2011. 
48  BEHRENS, COULIE, GENOESE ET AL. 
 
Table 17. Share of fossil and solid fuels in gross inland consumption and in power generation in 
selected EU member states from central and eastern Europe, 2011 (%) 
 Share in gross inland consumption Share in power generation 
 Fossil fuels Solid fuels Fossil fuels Solid fuels 
Poland 91 53 92 85 
Czech Republic 79 42 59 54 
Romania 79 23 55 40 
Bulgaria 75 42 58 54 
EU27 75 17 50 26 
Hungary 74 11 48 18 
Slovakia 68 21 28 13 
Slovenia 67 21 36 33 
Source: European Commission (2013a). 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria show high shares of solid fuels in their 
energy mix. The case study on Poland (see Annex 1) suggests that the higher the share 
of fossil fuels in primary energy supply, the higher the number of jobs that will be lost 
in a decarbonisation scenario.  
Similarly, a slowdown in the construction of new fossil-fired capacity in the power 
sector may result in job losses (in CIM), potentially affecting countries with relatively 
high shares of fossil fuels in power generation, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria and Romania. However, this may affect less those countries where lower 
shares of solid fuels in power generation are compensated by substantial shares of 
nuclear power (for example, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia have shares of between 
39% and 54% of nuclear power in their power mix). 
Besides the future evolution of fossil fuels and nuclear power, the extent to which 
employment in the energy sector in central and eastern Europe may increase will also 
depend on the future deployment of RES capacity. 
With much higher shares of RES, the situation in northern Europe is quite different 
from that in central and eastern Europe. The share of RES in the primary energy mix 
and power mix is above the EU27-average in all Nordic countries.  
Table 18 summarises these shares for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
Table 18. Share of RES in gross inland consumption and in power generation in northern 
European countries, 2011 (%) 
 Share in gross final energy consumption Share in power generation 
Norway 65 100 
Sweden 45 60 
Finland 32 29 
Denmark 23 36 
EU27 13 21 
Source: Eurostat, 2013b. 
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The case study on Sweden (see Annex 1) shows that a high share of RES in the 
electricity mix is beneficial to employment levels, and that even a full phase out of 
(already comparatively low levels of) fossil fuels can have a positive net effect on 
employment. This suggests that in northern Europe, there may be the potential for job 
creation by further increasing the share of RES in the energy mix. With currently (for 
Nordic countries) modest shares of RES in final energy consumption, that potential 
may be largest in Denmark and Finland. In Norway, which already generates all of its 
electricity from RES, future potential for job creation is less clear. 
Similarly to northern Europe, southern European countries also have relatively high 
shares of RES in their electricity mix when compared with the EU average (with the 
exception of Greece). However, in the south the share of gas is also relatively high, as 
shown in Table 19. 
Table 19. Share of RES and gas in power generation in selected southern European countries, 
2011 (%) 
 Share of RES in power generation Share of gas in power generation 
Portugal 47 28 
Spain 30 29 
Italy 28 50 
Greece 14 23 
EU27 21 22 
Source: European Commission, 2013a. 
The case study on Spain (see Annex 1) shows that the fast deployment of RES may 
create jobs, especially if accompanied by a simultaneous deployment of gas-fired 
capacity. As shown in Table 19, the respective shares of RES and gas in the power mix 
of Portugal and Italy suggest potentially similar employment results to those of Spain. 
However, despite natural resources favourable to RES development (e.g. solar 
radiation), southern European countries might not realise their RES potential due to 
financial constraints resulting from the economic crisis. The case study on Spain 
suggests that such a development may translate into fewer jobs as well. 
3.2.5 The potential role of exports 
Many EU member states are among the global leaders in terms of investments in RES 
technologies and installed capacities. This is particularly true for Germany, Spain and 
Italy (REN21, 2013). Technical expertise and global leadership can lead to additional 
demand for low carbon technologies from third countries, boosting exports of EU 
technology. In general, existing studies tend to agree on the growing global market and 
consequent growing export (and job) opportunities for green technologies, but there is 
no consensus on how to quantify this market. 
It is worth pointing out two caveats when estimating export values of RES 
technologies. First, there are uncertainties in the quantification of import and export 
values of these technologies. This is due to the fact that trade balance statistics do not 
account for technologies but for components (Groba and Kemfert, 2011). Moreover, it is 
not possible to distinguish between pre-products and end products. As the main 
components for each technology are known, it is possible to estimate the import and 
export values for those components that are needed for a certain green technology. 
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However, in some cases a clear assignment is not possible and thus the values may be 
overestimated. In the case of exports there is also the opposite effect, however, as 
exports are typically underrepresented in global trade statistics,66 including the 
commonly used UN Comtrade67 database (Groba and Kemfert, 2011). The second 
caveat is that the set of low-carbon technologies is not well defined.68 For the purpose 
of their analysis, Gehrke and Schasse (2013a) include technologies for the use of 
renewable energy sources as well as energy efficiency technologies, but also combined 
cycle gas turbines because of their (relatively) low specific emissions when producing 
electricity. In contrast, Groba and Kemfert (2011) only assess import and export values 
of renewable energy technologies. It is evident that the inclusion or exclusion of certain 
technology groups greatly affects the outcome of the analysis. 
In general, data availability for the EU as a whole is scarce. However, there have been a 
number of studies focusing on Germany. According to Gehrke and Schasse (2013a), 
low-carbon technology components had an export value of €20 billion in 2011. In the 
same year, the import value of such components amounted to €14.5 billion. These 
values correspond to a share of 2% of the import/export value of industrial goods in 
general. In 2002, this share was 1.5%. Accounting for half of the exports and two thirds 
of the imports of low-carbon technologies, goods for the use of renewable energy 
sources – e.g. wind and hydro turbines, solar cells, solar modules, mirrors, power 
inverters, (heat) pumps, etc. – dominate the trade statistics,. Components for energy 
efficiency technologies and turbines for low emission heat or electricity generation 
constitute the remaining trading volume of low-carbon goods.  
On the global level, Germany is the second-largest exporting country of green 
technologies, with a share of 15% of the total trading volume (Büchele et al., 2012). The 
world’s leading supplier is China. In the last decade, China’s importance has been 
growing significantly, especially in the field of solar energy. Their share of the global 
export value for low-carbon technologies increased from 4.5% in 2002 to 20.1% in 2011 
(Gehrke and Schasse, 2013a). This increase was partly fuelled by the rising demand for 
solar cells in Germany, which was not covered by domestic German production. 
Nevertheless, in the same period the value of German green technology exports was 
constantly above the corresponding import value thanks to a rapidly growing global 
market.  
The future development of exports of low-carbon technologies is characterised by an 
even higher degree of uncertainty. Capros (2014) points out that in a scenario where 
the EU takes early action and the rest of the world joins decarbonisation efforts after 
2030, the EU can achieve cost advantages as a first mover allowing it to lead global 
markets at least for a limited time. However, this advantage would diminish over time 
due to the worldwide diffusion of technologies. Main winners of European low-carbon 
exports would be electric vehicles, while CCS and RES technologies are also important. 
In such a scenario, EU exports may increase by 1.4% cumulatively compared with the 
reference scenario (Capros, 2014).  
Existing studies show that there are and will continue to be export (and therefore job 
creation) opportunities for first-moving countries that provide green technologies. 
However, a quantification of the employment effect is beyond the scope of this paper, 
                                                   
66 It is generally easier to collect data for imports than for exports, as the imports may be subject to custom 
charges. 
67 World Integrated Trade Solution: wits.worldbank.org/wits/ 
68 A comprehensive methodological overview is provided in Gehrke and Schasse (2013b). 
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as we focus on power generation but do not cover the supply chain of generation (e.g. 
the supply of materials for power plants). Moreover, a quantification of export values 
is subject to great uncertainty due to the aforementioned reasons, even ex post, 
resulting in further uncertainties regarding the job creation effect. 
3.2.6 Fiscal implications 
There are various measures governments can take to support the penetration of RES in 
the energy/power system, including tax reductions, public investments, capital 
subsidies, investment or production tax credits and energy production payments 
(IRENA, 2013). However, as shown above, government intervention to increase the 
share of renewables in the context of decarbonising the EU energy system will not only 
create new, comparably higher-skilled jobs, but will also lead to the destruction of jobs 
related to fossil fuels. There will thus increasingly be further fiscal implications related 
to the energy transition. These will include costs for measures aimed at matching 
changing employment demand and supply patterns, both in quantitative and in 
qualitative terms. In quantitative terms, the creation of new jobs and the destruction of 
others will affect income tax revenues as well as social security spending. Since this 
paper suggests a net increase in employment levels in decarbonisation scenarios, a 
positive effect on both income tax revenues (i.e. an increase) and social security 
spending (i.e. a decrease) can generally be expected. In qualitative terms, however, the 
skills transition might entail additional spending to match the new skills demand with 
a corresponding supply. Examples of such costs include costs of education and 
(re)training. Structural and frictional unemployment related to the skills transition may 
additionally entail increases in social security spending (i.e. unemployment benefits), 
although potentially only for a limited period of time. Finally, some workers may enter 
early retirement, raising spending on pensions. 
The EU budget can address skill shortages through training and technical assistance 
programmes and support to SMEs (e.g. COSME policy, cohesion policy for SME 
creation, technical assistance, etc.), but by how much remains unclear. The 
programmes, if well designed, can have a substantial impact. Technical assistance 
investments can lead to the leverage of considerable sums for large-scale projects, 
promoting employment and further skill development. In the area of energy for 
example, technical assistance programmes such as the ELENA programme have 
attracted investment funds 40 times higher than the EU budget assistance.  
To summarise, the transition to a low-carbon energy sector will have both positive and 
negative effects on public budgets. On the one hand, increasing employment levels 
may positively impact public budgets by increasing income tax revenues and 
decreasing social security spending. The skills transition, on the other hand, may 
require more public spending in terms of education and (re)training, as well as 
(temporary) unemployment benefits. In the long term, however, (global) efforts to fight 
climate change are likely to have positive fiscal effects by reducing costs for adaptation 
and from loss and damages related to dangerous climate change in the future (Stern, 
2006). 
4. Summary and conclusions 
This paper established a methodology for analysing employment impacts of changes in 
the composition of the primary (fossil) fuel mix and the electricity mix that are 
projected to occur in the context of a new socio-ecological transition away from fossil 
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fuels. The methodology is based on employment factors. It allows for calculating 
employment impacts by multiplying (future) energy units (in ktoe for primary fuels 
and MW for the power sector) by technology-specific employment factors. These 
employment factors are equivalent to labour intensity ratios expressed in jobs per ktoe 
or jobs per MW. They are calculated on the basis of current energy sector figures and 
then used to calculate the number of jobs linked to the projected future volumes of 
primary energy and levels of installed electric capacity in the years 2020, 2030 and 
2050. Projections are based on the reference scenario and two decarbonisation scenarios 
(Diversified Supply Technologies and High-RES) of the European Commission’s 
Energy Roadmap 2050. 
This methodology is applied to primary energy activities linked to fossil fuels as well 
as to the power sector. For activities linked to primary energy carriers, only fossil fuels 
are considered because RES such as wind, solar and hydro power do not require 
combustibles. Therefore, there is no fuel that needs to be extracted and/or processed. 
Regarding biomass and nuclear, no separate job figures are available for primary 
activities. As regards the power sector, a distinction is made between jobs in the 
construction, installation and manufacturing (CIM) of new electric capacity and jobs in 
the operation and maintenance (O&M) of existing and projected electric capacity. 
While there will be many effects of the decarbonisation of the energy system on the 
labour market (direct, indirect and induced), this study focuses only on direct 
employment for reasons of data availability and the difficulties associated with 
assigning indirect or induced jobs to specific technologies.  
Apart from changes in the quantity of direct jobs associated with the energy transition, 
this report also analyses how required qualification levels may change. This is done by 
applying the current distribution of low, medium and highly qualified jobs in various 
energy technologies to the changed mix of primary (fossil) fuels and of power sources 
in the future. 
Figures underlying the calculations are based on a variety of sources, but the lack of 
detailed data on the level of individual technologies is a serious issue. Based on 
available figures and own calculations, estimations of the current employment level in 
the EU are derived. Since available figures are subject to variance, a lower range and an 
upper range of current employment, employment factors and consequently of future 
employment levels are established. Another drawback of this methodology is the fact 
that constant employment factors are used for the calculations of future employment 
levels. Disregarding any potential future reductions in labour intensity, this is done 
due to a lack of reliable information on how labour intensities might develop in the 
future for different energy technologies. In essence, this means that future employment 
figures may be overestimated, but by how much is uncertain. However, this 
overestimation may be counterbalanced by potentially positive impacts on 
employment resulting from increasingly decentralised electricity generation in the 
future, which have not been taken into account in this paper. An additional element of 
uncertainty regarding this methodology is introduced by the scenarios about the future 
development of the EU energy system. Scenarios are not forecasts of the future, but 
rather present a range of possible developments. These visions of the future energy 
system are highly dependent on a number of assumptions being made about an 
uncertain future. However, in the context of WP11 of the NEUJOBS project, they are 
required to identify potential future developments in the energy sector, which can be 
used to analyse related employment impacts. 
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Even when taking all these shortcomings into account, the employment factor based 
methodology still allows for identifying patterns regarding employment in a 
progressively decarbonising EU energy sector. The starting point is an energy sector 
largely dominated by fossil fuels, both in primary sources as well as in the power 
sector. The total number of direct jobs provided by the EU energy sector in 2011 is 
estimated at between 1.5 million (DG Energy) and 2.2 million (Eurostat, LFS), 
representing a share of 0.7-1% of the total employed workforce in that year. Electric 
power generation, transmission and distribution is by far the largest employer, 
providing for roughly 55-60% of all direct jobs in the energy sector. The extraction of 
primary fossil energy employs less than a quarter of all direct jobs, while other oil and 
gas activities (including oil refining, manufacture and distribution of gas) provide less 
than 20%.  
As regards current qualification levels, it can be generalised that some 10% of the 
labour force employed in the energy sector in 2012 were low qualified, around 50-60% 
were medium qualified and around 40% were highly qualified. Qualification levels in 
the RES sector are similar to the overall energy sector, albeit possibly with a slightly 
higher share of highly qualified workers. However, there is a pronounced difference 
between qualifications required in the RES sector and in coal and lignite mining 
activities, where the share of highly qualified labour is considerably below the average 
of the entire energy sector. 
Based on this stocktaking of the current energy sector, the calculation of employment 
factors for different energy technologies and the projections of the two decarbonisation 
scenarios, future employment levels are calculated for 2020, 2030 and 2050. According 
to our calculations and taking into account all uncertainties involved, total 
employment in the EU energy sector could increase from between 1.5 and 2.2 million in 
2011 to between 2.3 and 2.8 million in 2020, between 2.4 and 3.1 million in 2030, and to 
between 3.5 and 5.4 million in 2050, depending on the scenario and on the applied 
employment factors (i.e. the low or high range). The results indicate that job losses in 
primary (fossil) fuels are more than outweighed by job creation in RES activities in the 
power sector. 
The results also show that more jobs are created in the High-RES scenario than in any 
other scenario. In this scenario, there are up to 800,000 more jobs in 2020, 1.3 million 
more jobs by 2030 and 3.7 million more jobs by 2050 (all compared with 2011). 
Comparing the results for the High-RES scenario with the Reference scenario shows 
that up to 500,000 additional jobs may be created in the context of a decarbonisation by 
2030 and possibly even up to 2.3 million additional jobs by 2050. In the DST scenario, 
there may be 100,000 more jobs by 2030 compared with the Reference scenario, and 
600,000 additional jobs by 2050. 
The results show that decarbonisation in the context of a new SET can lead to 
substantial employment creation, particularly in the long term. While the results of the 
two decarbonisation scenarios are similar to the Reference scenario until 2020, 
differences begin to materialise by 2030, and in particular by 2050. However, as noted 
before, results for 2050 are subject to high uncertainty due to the linear approach (i.e. 
constant employment factors) in calculating job projections. It should also be noted that 
the employment factor methodology implies that the more costly RES are, the more 
jobs will be created. This is especially the case where non-depreciated fossil 
installations are replaced by low-carbon energy sources, thus accelerating the energy 
transition but also raising related costs. 
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As the employment level increases in both decarbonisation scenarios, the employment 
structure of the energy sector may shift to more highly qualified workers, particularly 
due to the relatively high level of qualification required in RES. This means that the 
energy sector will provide not only more jobs in the context of the new SET, but also 
better qualified ones. 
The transition to a low-carbon energy sector will have both positive and negative 
effects on public budgets. On the one hand, increasing employment levels may 
positively impact public budgets by increasing income tax revenues and decreasing 
social security spending. The skills transition, on the other hand, may require more 
public spending in terms of education and (re)training as well as (temporary) 
unemployment benefits as structural and frictional unemployment increases. In the 
long term, however, (global) efforts to fight climate change are likely to have positive 
fiscal effects by reducing costs for adaptation and from loss and damages related to 
dangerous climate change in the future. 
These results will be taken forward in the third deliverable of NEUJOBS WP11 (D11.3), 
which will derive specific policy conclusions and recommendations in order to provide 
guidance for policy-makers as employment patterns change in the context of the 
energy transition.  
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Case studies 
The purpose of the case studies is to show that the methodology used for EU-wide 
employment effects can also be applied on the member-state level to identify potential 
regional differences. The focus of the case studies is on Poland, Sweden and Spain, but 
depending on data availability, the methodology can be applied to any member state 
and third country. 
Poland has been selected because of its primary energy mix largely dominated by fossil 
fuels, and its power generation mix largely dependent on coal. Poland also has a 
different structure of final energy use from western Europe, with a relatively low 
demand for electricity due to a high use of hard coal for heating purposes (Bukowksi et 
al., 2013). Sweden has a very different outlook, with already high shares of RES in its 
primary and electricity mixes, and an objective of zero net GHG emissions in 2050. 
Spain has been selected mainly for its fast growth of RES as primary energy source in 
the past and for its geographical location in the south of Europe. 
1.1 Methodology 
Each case study analyses the current energy balance of the country, as well as the 
employment linked to it. They address both employment level and structure. Energy 
sector data and figures are taken from national energy strategies for 2020, 2030, and 
2050 (if available). 
Future employment calculations are based on the same methodology used above, i.e. 
by multiplying energy units by employment factors. For the case studies, national 
employment factors are compared with EU employment factors. However, projections 
for future employment are calculated with the EU factors for two reasons: 
- Over time, differences between member states are expected to even out. As 
economies converge, labour productivity for technologies should also converge. 
Convergence of productivity is discussed in NEUJOBS WP8 (D8.3) on Regional 
disparities, ageing and territorial aspects of employment. 
- National factors cannot be defined for all technologies, due to a lack of data 
(mainly in terms of job figures per technology in individual countries). 
1.2 Poland 
Among all EU member states, Poland relies most heavily on coal for power generation. 
Roughly 85% of electricity produced in Poland is generated through solid fuel 
combustion (see Table 20). To effectively reduce its GHG emissions, Poland will need 
to clean up its power sector. Therefore, scrutinising the effects of decarbonisation of 
such a coal-dependent power sector is of great importance for this study. 
1.2.1 Energy balance 
In 2011, total power production in Poland reached 163.4 TWh (PAIiIZ, 2013). Poland 
derives about 85% of this power supply (138 TWh) through the combustion of solid 
fuels.69 Therefore, and as illustrated by Table 20, when compared with the EU average 
(26%), Poland is heavily reliant on coal for electricity production. Generating 7.6 TWh 
                                                   
69 Including hard coal (53%) and lignite (32%) (Egenhofer et al., 2013). 
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of power, biomass was the second largest source of electricity and its contribution to 
the total energy production was one percentage point above the EU average. As 
opposed to the EU (22%), Poland barely uses gas for electric generation (4%). While 
wind holds a mere 2% of total power production, it is worth noting that between 2010 
and 2011, power generation from wind installations doubled, increasing from 1.6 TWh 
to 3.2 TWh (ARE, 2012). Other sources of power supply include oil products (3%) and 
hydro (1%). Whereas nuclear makes up the bulk of the EU’s generating portfolio (28%), 
there are no nuclear power plants operating in Poland. 
Table 20. Power generation by sources in Poland and in the EU-27 (2011 data) 
 Poland EU-27 
Fuel type Power 
production 
(in TWh) 
Share of total 
production 
Power 
production 
(in TWh) 
Share of total 
production 
Nuclear 0 0% 906.8 28% 
Solid fuels  139.8 85% 848.7 26% 
Gases 5.8 4% 726.5 22% 
Oil products 4.7 3% 73.6 2% 
Hydro 2.3 1% 335.2 10% 
Wind 3.2 2% 179.0 5% 
Biomass 7.6 5% 132.6 4% 
Solar n. a. n. a. 46.3 1% 
Geothermal n. a. n. a. 5.9 0.2% 
Ocean n. a. n. a. 0.5 0.02% 
Total 163.4 100% 3,279.6 100% 
Sources: ARE (2012); Eurostat (2013b). 
1.2.2 The energy strategy of Poland 
At present, the Polish energy policy is based on a document entitled Energy Policy of 
Poland until 2030 (Ministry of Economy, 2009a) and the objectives of the Climate and 
Energy Package. In the context of the 20-20-20 targets, differentiated national targets 
for the share of RES in final energy consumption have been introduced. Poland is 
committed to increasing its power production from RES to 15% by the year 2020. 
Prepared by the Polish Ministry of Economy, the Energy Policy of Poland until 2030 was 
presented in 2009. The document includes a set of non-binding targets for 2020 and 
2030. The main objectives of the strategy are to improve energy security, enhance 
energy efficiency, promote the use of RES and introduce nuclear energy to the power 
generation portfolio (Ministry of Economy, 2009a). The strategy is completed by an 
appendix that provides projections for the future demand for energy (Ministry of 
Economy, 2009b). 
The Polish Ministry of Economy is currently working on a new energy strategy, and 
the 2009 strategy will thus soon be replaced (Hinc, 2013). Therefore, long-range 
projections presented in this section are based on a non-official roadmap outlining the 
pathways to a low-carbon economy in Poland. Entitled 2050.pl: the journey to the low-
emission future (Bukowski et al., 2013), the roadmap compares a set of modernisation 
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scenarios to a reference scenario. In this case study, the European Climate Foundation 
(ECF) Full diversification variant70 is compared with the ECF Reference scenario. 
Primary fuels 
As shown by Figure 14, the composition of the primary energy mix varies among 
scenarios. In the ECF Reference scenario, fuel consumption is dominated by coal. In 
2030, demand for coal amounts to 69 Mtoe. By 2050, this rises to 75 Mtoe, accounting 
for 54% of the primary energy mix. Note that between 2030 and 2050, the primary 
energy supply increases from 127 Mtoe to 138 Mtoe. In the ECF Full diversification 
scenario, primary energy consumption shrinks from 107 Mtoe in 2030 to 96 Mtoe in 
2050. In comparison to the Reference scenario, coal plays a more limited role, yet 
remains the main energy carrier in 2030. It loses importance in the 2040s and by 2050, 
coal contributes roughly 19% to the primary energy supply. RES hold a 21% share of 
the primary energy mix. Note that natural gas becomes the main energy carrier in that 
year (27%, or 26 Mtoe). 
Figure 14. Primary energy mix in Poland in 2030 and 2050 (Mtoe) 
 
Source: Bukowski et al. (2013). 
Power sector 
In the 2009 strategy, final demand for electricity is projected to grow by 55% between 
2006 and 2030. To meet that demand, installed capacity increases from 35 GW in 2006 
to 51 GW in 2030. Thereafter, solid fuels continue to dominate the power sector in 
Poland in the ECF Reference scenario (see Figure 15). Between 2030 and 2050, total 
installed capacity of coal-fired power plants increases from 37 GW to 50 GW. In 2050, 
coal-fired installations account for 80% of the total installed capacity in Poland. In the 
ECF Full diversification scenario, the total installed capacity grows from 66 GW in 2030 
to 107 GW in 2050, i.e. +38% (see Figure 15). By 2050, coal-fired blocks represent a mere 
7% of the totalled installed capacity in Poland. All forms of RES71 make up the bulk of 
installed generation capacity (58%). Nevertheless, the role of RES is less important than 
in both EU decarbonisation scenarios.  
                                                   
70 This scenario relies on all technological options: fossil fuels, nuclear energy, RES, distributed 
generation, and imports. 
71 Including imports.  
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Figure 15. Structure of installed capacity in 2030 and 2050 in Poland (GW) 
 
Source: Bukowski et al. (2013). 
1.2.3 Employment in the current Polish energy supply sector 
Table 21 provides figures for employment levels72 and structure73 in the energy sector 
in Poland in 2011.74 To allow for a comparison, EU figures for the employment 
structure are also given. Overall, employment in extractive industries is concentrated 
in coal and lignite mining. The bulk of employment in oil and gas depends on 
imported volumes, i.e. it is in oil refining and marketing, and in gas transmission and 
distribution. Finally, most employment in RES is in biomass, which includes jobs in 
collecting and processing feedstock. 
In terms of qualification levels (see Table 21, right part), energy activities in Poland are 
rather homogenous, with a majority of workers being medium qualified (61% to 78%), 
except for oil and gas extraction (47%). Highly qualified workers make up 27-35% of 
the workforce in each sector, except in coal mining (14%). Compared with the EU, 
activities related to oil and gas extraction as well as to electricity have a lower 
qualification level in Poland, i.e. there is a higher share of medium skilled and highly 
skilled jobs for these activities in the EU. The employment structure of other activities 
is comparable to EU figures. The crucial difference between Poland and the EU average 
is the significant role of jobs in mining.  
 
 
                                                   
72 Source: Eurostat (2013d). SBS is used instead of LFS, because LFS does not provide the required 
data. 
73 Source: Cedefop (2013). 
74 Number of jobs as reported by Eurostat and based on NACE Rev. 2 classification. Data on 
qualification levels as reported by Cedefop (2013) and based on NACE Rev. 1.1 classification. This 
results in differences in the definitions of activities in the left column of Table 21. For details on job 
numbers based on NACE Rev. 2, see Table 5 in Section 3.1.1.2, and for details on qualification levels 
based on NACE Rev. 1.1, see Table 7 in Section 3.1.2.2. 
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Table 21. Direct employment and structure of qualification levels in the energy sector in Poland 
and in the EU27 in 2011 
Activity Number of 
jobs 
Low qualified 
(%) 
Medium 
qualified (%) 
Highly 
qualified (%) 
 Poland (PL) PL EU PL EU PL EU 
Mining of coal and lignite 122,061-
186,00075 8 10 78 75 14 15 
Oil and gas extraction 6,50076 21 11 47 47 32 42 
Manufacture of coke and 
refined petroleum products 13,724 n. a. 8 61 55 35 37 
Electricity77 93,200 4 8 69 55 27 37 
Manufacture of gas and 
distribution through mains 11,406 4 7 69 60 27 33 
Sources: Cedefop, 2013; Eurostat, 2013d. 
Based on the data provided in Table 20 and Table 21, employment factors (equivalent 
to labour intensities) for Poland are calculated. Table 22 shows these figures both for 
Poland and the EU. 
Table 22. Labour intensity of primary energy activities in the EU27 and in Poland in 2011 
 EU Poland 
 Employment factor 
(jobs/ktoe) 
Employment 
factor (jobs/ktoe) Direct jobs Energy (ktoe) 
Mining of coal and 
lignite [B05] 1.37 – 2.06 2.19 – 3.34 
122,061 – 
186,000 55,760 
Oil and gas 
extraction 0.49 – 0.81 1.33 6,500
78 4,900 
Oil refining [C19.2] 0.20 – 0.33 0.35 9,399 26,510 
Gas other [D35.2] 0.37 – 0.53 0.85 11,406 13,490 
Sources: Eurostat, 2013c and 2013d. 
The comparison of Polish employment factors for primary fuels with the EU average 
factors reveals a less productive primary energy sector in Poland. This means that 
more people are needed per unit of energy produced. For instance, Poland’s solid fuels 
industry remains more manual than that of other EU member states.79 The relatively 
low productivity of oil and gas extraction may be explained by the same reason. 
It is worth mentioning that the mining sector in Poland has been subject to structural 
changes since 1989, aimed at improving its productivity. Around 330,000 jobs have 
been lost in the process (IEA, 2011b). Given the depletion of domestic coal and lignite 
                                                   
75 In line with the figure of 128,000 direct jobs in 2012 by Euracoal (2013). 
76 Source: estimation by Cedefop (2013). 
77 Qualification levels also include activities in steam and hot water supply. 
78 Estimation by Cedefop (2013). 
79 Based on an interview with Euracoal. 
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resources (ibid.) and further desired improvements in productivity, employment in the 
sector continues to decline.80 
For the power sector, the lack of data prevents a comparison of employment factors for 
Poland with EU factors. To assess the employment level and structure of the future 
Polish energy sector, EU employment factors have been used, thus assuming 
convergence at the EU level. 
1.2.4 Employment in the future Polish energy supply sector 
Primary fuels 
Table 23 shows the projections for future employment in primary fuels based on the 
scenarios presented in the previous section. There is a significant decline in 
employment of nearly 20% from 2011 to 2020 in all scenarios. This is mainly related to 
the use of EU employment factors, which are lower than the Polish employment factors 
(see Table 22).81 The underlying assumption is that the labour intensity of similar 
activities will converge in Europe over time. 
From 2011 to 2030, the employment related to primary fuels decreases significantly in 
the ECF Full diversification scenario (-33%) and less significantly both in the ECF 
Reference scenario (-17%) and in the 2009 strategy scenario (-13%). Overall, this 
development is not surprising given that fossil fuels continue to play a significant role 
in the primary energy mix in those two scenarios. Significant differences between the 
various scenarios begin to materialise after 2020 because the targets for the year 2020 
have already been set. The bulk of the job losses are attributable to the decrease in 
domestic coal production. 
Table 23. Direct employment in primary fuel activities in Poland in 2011, 2020, 2030 and 2050 
 2011 2020 2030 2050 
  2009 
strat. 
ECF 
Ref 
ECF 
full 
div. 
2009 
strat. 
ECF 
Ref 
ECF 
full 
div. 
ECF 
Ref 
ECF 
full 
div. 
Solid 
fuels 
[B05] 
122,000 
– 
186,000 
90,619 92,700 94,760 95,625 92,700 72,100 78,280 30,900 
Oil and 
gas 
extraction 
n. a. n. a. 4,050 3,240 n. a. 4,860 4,860 5,670 6,480 
Oil 
refining 
[C19.2] 
9,399 9,042 10,230 9,240 10,263 11,220 8,910 11,220 6,270 
Gas other  
[D35.2] 
11,406 7,685 7,950 6,890 9,116 9,010 10,600 10,600 13,780 
 
Source: own calculations, based on Bukowksi et al. (2013); Ministry of Economy (2009b). 
                                                   
80 The productivity of coal and lignite mining in Poland is still relatively low. For instance, in 2010, 
there were 981 jobs per million tons of coal and lignite produced in Poland, against 224 in Germany 
(based on Eurocoal (2011)). 
81 Moreover, projections do not include the number of jobs linked to imported volumes of coal. They 
may thus be further underestimated. 
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In terms of qualifications, there is little change in the reference scenario, since 
employment levels remain stable per activity. However, the Full diversification 
scenario has an adverse impact on medium qualified workers, since it may primarily 
cause job losses in coal mining (78% of medium qualified workers).  
Power sector82 
In the 2009 strategy, employment in the power sector decreases by roughly 35% from 
2011 to 2030. This is mainly due to a decrease in CIM jobs in solids-fired power 
generation, while the O&M employment base remains stable. The creation of 11,000 
jobs in nuclear power and around 20,000 jobs in RES-E between 2020 and 2030 is not 
enough to offset the decrease in employment in fossil fuel related activities. 
The ECF scenarios do not allow for a distinction between CIM and O&M jobs, because 
the newly installed capacities are not disclosed in the reports. Therefore, no in-depth 
calculations can be conducted for these scenarios. For 2050, the difference between the 
installed capacity in 2050 and in 2030 can be used to estimate the newly installed 
capacity. In the following, results for 2050 are discussed. 
By 2050, there are 73,000 jobs in the power sector in the Reference scenario, against 
141,000 in the Full diversification scenario. Similar to the EU, this is due to the 
difference in RES installed capacity, which results in 9,000 people employed in RES in 
the Reference scenario, against 94,000 in the Full diversification scenario.  
The increase of the employment level in the power sector in the Full diversification 
scenario is not expected to have a strong impact on the employment structure. 
Although the decrease in coal-based power generation affects mainly medium 
qualified workers, the increase in jobs in gas and in RES create jobs mainly for medium 
skilled, and only to a lesser extent for highly skilled workers.  
1.2.5 Conclusions 
Compared with the EU, employment in primary fuels in Poland decreases more in the 
decarbonisation scenario than in the reference scenario. This is especially the case for 
employment in solid fuels. Similar to the results for the EU, the difference between a 
low-carbon and a business-as-usual pathway becomes more visible over time. 
In contrast to the EU, employment in the power sector in Poland is projected to 
decrease by 2030. This is due to the decreasing amount of new installations of coal-
based capacity which has a larger impact on Poland than on the EU, given the much 
larger share of solid fuels in the Polish power generation mix (85% versus 26% for the 
EU). By 2050, there are almost twice as many jobs in the power sector in Poland in the 
decarbonisation scenario than in the reference scenario. This is in line with the results 
for the Reference and the High-RES scenario for the EU.  
Overall, for the total energy sector, the difference between a business-as-usual pathway 
and a low-emission pathway in Poland is not high in terms of jobs. By 2030, 
diversification of the energy sector might have a negative impact on employment in 
Poland (30,000 fewer jobs compared with the Reference scenario). By 2050, however, 
                                                   
82 Methodological notes: (1) The upper range of EU employment factors is used for fossil fuels given 
the high labour intensity in Poland. (2) For the category “distributed intermittent” in the ECF 
roadmap, the employment factor used is the average of the EU factors for solar PV, small hydro, and 
biogas (the three sources that are detailed in the 2009 strategy). (3) Projections for new installed 
capacity come from a monitoring report of the Ministry of Economy on the security of electricity 
supply in 2011-2012 (Ministerstwo Gospodarki (2013)). 
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the impact on employment may be positive, with close to 40,000 additional jobs in the 
Full diversification scenario. 
Table 24. Direct employment in the energy sector in Poland in 2050 
 2050 
 Reference Full diversification 
Primary fuels 105,770 57,430 
Power sector 73,019 140,741 
Total 180,507 218,241 
Source: own calculations. 
The core difference in the long term between the Reference and the Full diversification 
scenario is that in the Reference scenario, the bulk of employment is in primary fuels, 
whereas in the Full diversification scenario, the bulk of employment is in the power 
sector. Results are shown in Table 24. 
Overall, by 2050, there are 21% more jobs in the energy sector in the decarbonisation 
scenario than in the Reference scenario for Poland. This places it between the DST 
scenario (+12%) and the High-RES scenario (+38%) when compared with the Reference 
scenario for the EU energy sector. 
1.3 Sweden83 
The second case study is on Sweden. In contrast to Poland, Sweden already had a very 
high share of RES in its energy mix in 2011 and aims to emit zero net GHG emissions 
by 2050. It has been selected not only to represent a country with a strong 
decarbonisation agenda, but also to represent a country from northern Europe. 
1.3.1 Energy balance 
Table 25 shows that Sweden’s energy balance is dominated by low-carbon energy 
sources. The country produces hardly any fossil fuels domestically and only imports 
significant quantities of petroleum. Gross inland consumption is based on RES, nuclear 
and oil with almost equal shares. Coal and natural gas play a negligible role.  
Table 25. Energy balance of Sweden in 2011 
 Production 
(Mtoe) 
Imports 
(Mtoe) 
Imports 
share in total 
supply 
Share in gross 
inland 
consumption 
Share in 
electricity 
mix 
Solid fuels 0.2 2.4 92% 5% 1% 
Petroleum 
and products 
0.1 15.9 99% 29.5% 0.5% 
Gases 0.0 1.2 100% 2.5% 1.5% 
Nuclear 15.6  0% 31.5% 40% 
RES 15.7  0% 32% 56% 
Source: European Commission, 2013a. 
Sweden already has an almost carbon-free power sector, which relies almost 
exclusively on RES (56%, mainly large hydro power84) and nuclear power (40%). 
                                                   
83 With the assistance of Susanna Roth, Visiting Mistra Fellow at CEPS. 
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1.3.2 The energy strategy of Sweden 
Sweden has national targets for RES for 2020, and a vision for zero net GHG emissions 
in 2050. 
Targets for the year 2020  
Under the EU “renewables directive” (2009/28/EC), Sweden is subject to a binding 
national target for the share of RES in gross final energy consumption of 49% by 2020. 
In addition, Sweden will need to provide at least a 10% share of RES in the transport 
sector by 2020. Based on the targets set by the renewables directive, Sweden in 2009 
adopted a new energy and climate policy with the following targets for the year 2020: 
- 40% reduction in greenhouse gases compared with 1990. 
- At least 50% share of renewable energy in the energy mix. 
- At least 10% share of renewable energy in the transport sector. 
- 20% more efficient use of energy compared with 2008. 
By 2010, Sweden had already reached a share of 47.8% RES in its energy mix, and 8% 
RES in the transport sector (Regeringskansliet, 2011, 2012). 
In absolute terms, the national target for 2020 is to increase renewable electricity in the 
electricity certificate system by 25 TWh from 2002 to 2020, with a strong focus on wind 
power (both on- and off-shore). In 2011, an increase of 13.3 TWh had already been 
achieved (Swedish Energy Agency, 2012). 
Long-term vision 2050 
The Swedish government formulated in 2009 a vision for reaching zero net GHG 
emissions in 2050. It is currently developing a roadmap for how this objective could be 
realised. The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency and the Swedish Energy 
Agency (Energimyndigheten, 2012) have already published inputs for the roadmap on 
the electricity and heating sectors, including a scenario analysis. In addition, the IVL 
Swedish Environmental Research Institute modelled an RES scenario to analyse how a 
(close to) 100% share of RES in the energy mix could be reached by 2050 (Gustavsson et 
al., 2011). This RES scenario projects that total energy demand decreases from 400 TWh 
in 2010 to 270 TWh in 2050. The demand for electricity is also projected to decrease 
from 130 TWh in 2030 to 110 TWh in 2050.  
This case study uses the RES scenario of Gustavsson et al. (2011) for the calculations on 
future employment in primary fuels and in the power sector. For the power sector, a 
comparison with the Reference scenario of Energimyndigheten (2012) is added.  
Primary fuels 
In the RES scenario of Gustavsson et al. (2011), gas and all related activities are 
completely phased out by 2040, while all oil-related activities come to an end by 2050. 
The only fossil fuel left in the energy mix is coal (mainly used in the steel industry), but 
with a very low contribution to the overall energy mix (less than 5%).  
Power sector 
The RES scenario published by Gustavsson et al. (2011) assumes that nuclear power is 
completely phased out by 2040 and that hydro power generation remains constant at 
2010 levels until 2050. Strong increases are expected from wind and solar power, the 
latter in particular after 2040. The results are summarised in Figure 16. 
                                                                                                                                                     
84 Facilities of more than 10 MW of installed capacity. 
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Figure 16. Power generation in Sweden by source, 2010-2050 (TWh) 
 
Source: Gustavsson et al. (2011). 
Comparisons can be made with the Reference scenario of Energimyndigheten (2012). 
This scenario is based on current policies and measures. It does not project the 
achievement of the target of zero net GHG emissions in 2050. Results from this 
Reference scenario are presented in Figure 17 and show an increase in power 
generation until 2050, mainly based on an expansion of wind power. Nuclear power 
generation increases slightly, while hydro power generation remains constant in the 
timeframe under consideration. The main differences with the RES scenario are that 
nuclear power is not phased out85 and that there is no role foreseen for solar power. 
Oil- and gas-based power generation is phased out in both scenarios (oil in 2020 in the 
Reference scenario and in 2030 in the RES scenario; gas in 2030 in both scenarios).  
Figure 17. Power generation in Sweden by source in the Reference scenario, 2007-2050 (TWh) 
 
Source: Energimyndigheten (2012).86 
                                                   
85 The reference scenario nevertheless provides a variant with no new nuclear power, which leads to 
a capacity reduced by half in 2040 (compared with 2030) and a complete phase out by 2050. 
86 KVV industrin: CHP industry; KVV fjärrvärme: CHP district heating; Vindkraft: wind energy; 
Vattenkraft: hydropower; Kärnkraft: nuclear energy; Total användning netto: total net use. 
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1.3.3 Employment in the current Swedish energy supply sector 
The energy balance presented in Table 25 implies that there are no jobs in Sweden 
associated with the production of fossil fuels; almost all jobs related to fossil fuels are 
in oil refining. In the power sector, RES and nuclear power provide the vast majority of 
jobs. Table 26 presents the number of direct jobs per energy activity as well as the 
associated distribution of qualification levels in 2011.87 
Table 26. Direct employment and structure of qualification levels in the energy sector in 
Sweden in 2011 
Activity Number of 
jobs 
Low 
qualified 
Medium 
qualified 
Highly 
qualified 
Mining of coal and lignite - - - - 
Oil and gas extraction - - - - 
Manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum products 
2,300 12.7% 41.2% 46.1% 
Electricity 21,998 11.5% 52.4% 36.1% 
+ biomass and waste 18,477    
Gas other 303 - - - 
Sources: Cedefop (2013); Eurostat (2013c, 2013d); Liébard (2012). 
While Eurostat reports 22,000 jobs in the whole power sector in Sweden, Liébard (2012) 
reports a much higher figure of 32,000 jobs in RES-E related activities alone, of which 
18,500 are in biomass and waste. The difference between the Eurostat figure for the 
total power sector and the figure for jobs in RES only may be explained by the 
importance of the biomass and waste sector in Sweden, for which employment in 
collecting fuel is not included in the Eurostat figure. As a matter of fact, Sweden was 
the EU’s top consumer of wood pellets in 2011, and wood waste and black liquor made 
up for 83% of energy production through biomass (Liébard, 2012). Sweden is also the 
fifth-largest producer of energy from waste incineration in the EU, an energy source 
that is not included in Eurostat employment figure either. The inclusion of jobs in the 
supply of wood pellets and waste incineration thus explains the difference between the 
number of jobs in RES reported by Liébard (2012) and the number of jobs in the power 
sector reported by Eurostat. Employment in fuel supply for biomass and incineration 
of waste has not been added to the power sector for the EU as a whole (see Chapter 3) 
because it is less important at the EU level. 
Starting with the Eurostat figure of 22,000 jobs in the power sector and based on the EU 
employment factor for nuclear power (see Section 3.1.1.2) and the total installed 
capacity of nuclear power in Sweden in 2011, we estimate that there are 8,900 jobs in 
nuclear power generation in Sweden in 2011. Since power generation in Sweden relies 
almost exclusively on RES and nuclear, the remaining 13,100 jobs in the power sector 
are assumed to be in RES. Adding to this figure the number of jobs in biomass and 
waste (18,500) gives a total number of 31,600 people working in RES-E related activities 
                                                   
87 Number of jobs as reported by Eurostat and based on NACE Rev. 2 classification. Data on 
qualification levels as reported by Cedefop (2013) and based on NACE Rev. 1.1 classification. This 
results in differences in the definitions of activities in the left column ofTable 26. For details on job 
numbers based on NACE Rev. 2, see Table 5 in section 3.1.1.2, and for details on qualification levels 
based on NACE Rev. 1.1, see Table 7 in section 3.1.2.2. 
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in the power sector. This number is in line with the figure of 32,000 jobs derived from 
Liébard (2012). 
Based on Table 26, total employment in the Swedish energy sector amounts to 43,100 
jobs, of which almost three-quarters work in RES-E related activities. 
Levels of qualification in oil refining and the power sector in Sweden are similar to EU 
averages (see Section 3.1.2.2).  
As shown in Table 27, Sweden is below the EU average for labour intensity of oil and 
gas downstream activities. This means that fewer workers are required per energy unit 
produced. This justifies the use of the low range of EU factors in calculations for future 
employment related to primary fuels in Sweden. 
Table 27. Labour intensity of primary energy activities in the EU27 and in Sweden in 2011 
 EU Sweden 
Activity Jobs/ktoe Jobs/ktoe Direct jobs ktoe 
Oil refining [C19.2] 0.20 – 0.33 n. a. – 0.14 n. a. – 2,300 15,970 
Gas other [D35.2] 0.37 – 0.53 0.26 – n. a. 303 – n. a. 1,160 
Sources: own calculations based on European Commission (2013a); Eurostat (2013c, 2013d). 
Employment factors for RES show varying results compared with EU factors, with 
some lower, some similar, and some higher. Results are presented in Table 28. 
Table 28. Labour intensity of RES-E technologies in the EU27 and in Sweden in 2011 
 EU Sweden 
 Jobs/MW Jobs/MW Direct jobs MW 
Biomass and waste 8.22 4.66 18,477 3,968 
Small hydro 1.08 0.96 920 956 
Solar PV 2.35 9.30 174 2,769 
Wind 1.45 1.46 4,040 18,7 
Sources: own calculations based on Liébard (2012), and European Commission (2013a). Direct 
jobs: based on Liébard (2012); MW: biomass and waste: European Commission (2013a); Small 
hydro, solar PV and wind: Liébard (2012). 
While employment factors for wind and small hydro are similar to the EU averages, 
that for solar PV is considerably higher, while the factor for biomass and waste is 
substantially lower. The higher factor for solar PV may be explained by the relatively 
limited deployment of that technology in Sweden (only 18.7 MW of installed capacity 
in 2011). In contrast, biomass and waste is a mature industry in Sweden, with close to 
4,000 MW of installed capacity in 2011 (European Commission, 2013a), possibly 
enabling labour productivity gains. 
1.3.4 Employment in the future Swedish energy supply sector 
Primary fuels 
The RES scenario projects a complete phase out of fossil fuels in the primary energy 
supply by 2050. In terms of employment, the achievement of its 2050 target thus means 
that all jobs related to fossil fuels in Sweden will be lost. In 2011, most of these jobs 
(2,300) were in the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products. The rest (300) 
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were in the manufacture and distribution of gas. This means that in total, 2,600 jobs in 
primary activities will be lost. 
Power sector 
Available projections from both the RES scenario and the Reference scenario are in 
TWh. Since the methodology used in this report multiplies MW by employment 
factors, TWh are converted into MW with the use of capacity factors per technology in 
Nordic countries from IEA and Nordon (2013). 
Table 29 shows projected employment in the power sector for the Reference scenario 
and the RES scenario. In the Reference scenario, employment is stable between 2010 
and 2020 but then decreases until 2030. After 2030, it picks up again to reach 25% above 
2010 levels by 2050. In the RES scenario, on the other hand, employment in the power 
sector increases substantially (+57%) between 2010 and 2020. In the following decade 
until 2030 some jobs are lost again, but employment increases rapidly between 2030 
and 2050. 
Table 29. Current and projected direct employment in 2020, 2030, and 2050 in the power sector 
in Sweden  
 2011 2020 2030 2050 
Reference scenario 
43,100 
43,338 35,851 53,816 
RES scenario 67,737 61,985 119,395 
Source: own calculations. 
1.3.5 Conclusions 
The Swedish decarbonisation scenario projects a full phase out of fossil fuels. 
Therefore, all 2,600 jobs in primary fuels are lost. This is in contrast to the EU, where 
fossil fuels are not fully phased out. Thus, until 2050, one third of the EU employment 
level of 2011 can be preserved in the decarbonisation scenarios. 
In the power sector, the difference in the number of jobs created between the RES 
scenario and the reference scenario is proportionally higher for Sweden than for the EU 
(Reference vs. High-RES scenario) in all years considered (2020, 2030 and 2050). This is 
due to the proportionally higher difference in newly installed RES capacity between 
Sweden and the EU when comparing their RES/High-RES scenario to the 
corresponding reference scenario.  
Taking all the limitations of this calculation into consideration (data availability, 
linearity, focus on direct jobs, etc.), there may be a case in Sweden where its 
decarbonisation strategy until 2050 leads to an increase in employment in its energy 
sector. The 2,600 jobs lost in activities related to fossil fuels are easily outweighed by 
increasing job numbers in the power sector. Compared with the Reference scenario, the 
RES scenario may lead to the creation of 24,000, 26,000 and 66,000 additional jobs in the 
power sector by 2020, 2030 and 2050, respectively. In fact, by 2050 there may be more 
than twice as many people employed in the Swedish power sector in the RES scenario 
compared with the Reference scenario. However, there may be a dent in employment 
numbers between 2020 and 2030 due to a decline in new additional installed capacity, 
which requires attention. 
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1.4 Spain 
Spain experienced very fast growth of RES over the last decade, but with the 
background of the economic crisis, its strategy towards RES changed considerably. 
Currently, there is no energy strategy beyond 2020 and there is a moratorium on new 
renewable energy projects based on the suspension of financial incentives for 
investments in renewable energy. Given the high level of uncertainty, this case study 
only assesses developments until 2020. 
1.4.1 Energy balance 
RES primary production in Spain increased from 6.8 Mtoe in 2000 to 13.8 Mtoe in 2011 
(Eurostat, 2013b), mainly driven by wind power. In fact, wind power generation 
increased from 4,727 GWh in 2000 to 42,433 GWh in 2011, and solar PV from 18 GWh 
in 2000 to 7,386 GWh in 2011 (Eurostat, 2013b). However, despite these developments, 
Spain continues to rely heavily on fossil fuels, with some 78% of gross inland 
consumption being dependent on oil, gas and coal. Oil and oil products alone cover 
almost half of gross inland consumption and are almost entirely imported. The share of 
low-carbon energy sources is higher in the electricity mix, half of which is based on 
RES and nuclear and the other half on fossil fuels and in particular gas. Table 30 shows 
the energy balance of Spain in 2011. 
Table 30. Energy balance of Spain in 2011 
 Production 
(Mtoe) 
Imports 
(Mtoe) 
Imports 
share in total 
supply 
Share in gross 
inland 
consumption 
Share in 
electricity 
mix 
Solid fuels 2.6 8.7 77% 10% 15% 
Petroleum 
and products 
0.4 66.3 99% 45% 5% 
Gases 0 29.4 100% 23% 29% 
Nuclear 14.9  0% 12% 20% 
RES 13.8 0.9 6.5% 11% 30% 
Source: European Commission (2013a). 
1.4.2 The energy strategy of Spain 
Following the economic crisis, Spain enacted a law on Sustainable Economy in March 
2011, aimed at supporting the economic recovery of the country with a sustainable 
growth model. The law defines the national targets of 20% of RES in gross final energy 
consumption and 10% of RES in the transport sector by 2020. In addition, different 
strategic documents are related to the law on Sustainable Economy: 
- An indicative energy plan (Ministerio de Industria, Energía y Turismo, 2011), 
required by the law on Sustainable Economy to form the basis for a future 
binding energy framework. This plan until 2020 includes projections for future 
energy needs and the means to cover them.  
- A National Action Plan on Renewable Energies for 2011-2020, which defines the 
Spanish strategy for RES. It is complemented by the Renewable Energies Plan 2011-
2020 (Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio, 2011), which provides 
concrete measures to implement the strategy. 
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As of today there is no Spanish energy strategy post-2020. In January 2012, the Spanish 
government decided on a moratorium on new renewable energy projects, by 
suspending financial incentives to investors in renewable energy. Together with other 
changes in the legislation on RES since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, the 
moratorium has left the Spanish renewable energy sector facing uncertainty about the 
future. The following projections and results therefore only focus on 2020. 
Primary fuels 
Projections for primary fuels come from the indicative energy plan up to 2020 
(Ministerio de Industria, Energía y Turismo, 2011). This document contains three 
scenarios: a reference scenario, and two scenarios reflecting lower and higher energy 
demand than the reference case. The reference scenario is described as the most likely 
scenario and is thus used for the calculations in this case study. For primary fuels, the 
projections available are for primary energy consumption, i.e. the sum of production 
and imports. 
The primary energy consumption increases from 132 Mtoe in 2010 to 143 Mtoe in 2020 
(+8%). The share of fossil fuels decreases from 77% to 71% and the share of RES 
increases from 11% to 19.5%. Between 2010 and 2020 there will essentially be a shift 
away from fossil fuels towards more RES in the primary energy mix. In absolute terms, 
primary oil consumption decreases from 62,358 ktoe in 2010 to 51,980 ktoe in 2020, 
while the primary consumption of gas increases from 31,003 ktoe in 2010 to 39,237 ktoe 
in 2020. The primary consumption of coal increases slightly from 8,271 ktoe in 2010 to 
10,058 ktoe in 2020. 
Power sector 
The Spanish Renewable Energies Plan 2011-2020 provides projections for installed 
capacity only for RES. Therefore, projections for installed capacity in fossil fuels and 
nuclear are taken from Eurelectric (2012). Up to 2020, the installed capacity in coal and 
gas slightly increases (from 39,855 MW to 42,259 MW), with an increase in gas-fired 
capacity compensating for a slight decrease in coal-fired capacity. Nuclear power is 
projected to remain stable from 2010 to 2020. The capacity in RES (biomass and waste, 
small hydro, solar PV and wind) is projected to increase by 73%, from 29,737 MW in 
2011 to 51,535 MW in 2020. 
1.4.3 Employment in the current Spanish energy supply sector 
Table 31 presents figures for direct employment in the Spanish energy sector, as well as 
the distribution of qualification levels per energy activity in 2011.88 
 
 
 
                                                   
88 Number of jobs as reported by Eurostat and based on NACE Rev. 2 classification. Data on 
qualification levels as reported by Cedefop (2013) and based on NACE Rev. 1.1 classification. This 
results in differences in the definitions of activities in the left column of Table 26. For details on job 
numbers based on NACE Rev. 2, see Table 5 in Section 3.1.1.2, and for details on qualification levels 
based on NACE Rev. 1.1, see Table 7 in Section 3.1.2.2. 
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Table 31. Direct employment and structure of qualification levels in the energy sector in Spain 
in 2011 
Activity Number of 
jobs 
Low 
qualified 
Medium 
qualified 
Highly 
qualified 
Mining of coal and lignite 5,439 41% 15% 43% 
Oil and gas extraction89 280    
Manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum products 
9,280 13% 15% 72% 
Electricity90 
+ biomass and waste 
48,425 
20,891 
12% 22% 66% 
Gas other 3,299  22% 66% 
Sources: APPA (2011); Cedefop (2013); Eurostat (2013d). 
The distribution of qualification levels in the Spanish energy sector diverges strongly 
from the EU figures presented in Table 7. On the one hand, the share of highly 
qualified workers is substantially higher in all energy activities in Spain than in the EU 
average (around 30 percentage points higher across all activities). On the other hand, 
the share of medium qualified workers is substantially lower (15-20% in Spain 
compared with 50-60% in the EU). Additionally, the proportion of low qualified jobs in 
coal mining is 31 percentage points higher than the EU average.  
Labour intensity ratios for Spain (presented in Table 32) are in the range of the EU 
values for oil and gas extraction, and slightly lower for downstream activities like oil 
refining and manufacturing of gas and its distribution. These downstream activities are 
thus generally less labour intensive when compared with the EU average. 
Table 32. Employment factors for primary fuels in the EU27 and in Spain in 2011 (jobs/ktoe) 
 EU Spain 
 Jobs/ktoe Jobs/ktoe Direct jobs ktoe 
Coal and lignite mining 1.37 – 2.06 2.05 5,439 2,650 
Oil and gas extraction 0.49 – 0.81 0.65 280 430 
Oil refining 0.20 – 0.33 0.14 9,280 66,700 
Gas other 0.37 – 0.53 0.11 3,299 29,400 
Source: own calculations based on European Commission (2013a); Eurostat (2013d). 
Turning towards labour intensity of RES-E in the Spanish power sector, Table 33 shows 
that Spain is less labour intensive in activities related to small hydro power, wind 
power and (to a lesser extent) solar PV than the EU average. This may be due to the 
maturity of these technologies in Spain. Power produced from biomass and waste, on 
the other hand, is much more labour intensive in Spain when compared with the EU 
average. 
                                                   
89 Excluding support activities for extraction. 
90 The sum of jobs in electricity and biomass and waste totals 69,316. This includes 50,876 jobs in RES 
(APPA, 2011), for which the distribution of qualification levels is 50% low-to-medium qualified 
workers and 50% highly qualified workers (Jiménez Herrero and Leiva, 2010). 
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Table 33. Employment factors for RES-E technologies in the EU27 and in Spain in 2011 
(jobs/MW) 
 EU Spain 
 Jobs/MW Jobs/MW Direct jobs MW 
Biomass and waste 8.22 26.55 20,891 787 
Small hydro 1.08 0.55 1,056 1,930 
Solar PV 2.35 2.30 10,013 4,345 
Wind 1.45 0.73 15,813 21,547 
Sources: APPA (2011); European Commission (2013a); Liébard (2012). 
 
1.4.4 Employment in the future Spanish energy supply sector 
Primary fuels 
Overall, employment in fossil fuels increases from 18,018 jobs in 2011 to 30,353 jobs in 
2020.91 Almost all of the job gains occur in gas downstream activities. Such an increase 
is mainly due to the use of EU employment factors for the calculations, which for oil 
and gas are higher than the Spanish EU factors (see Table 32). 
Power sector 
For fossil-based and nuclear power generation, projections for 2020 are based on 
Eurelectric (2012). Projections for RES power generation are based on the Renewable 
Energies Plan 2011-2020 (Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio, 2011). 
Overall, employment in the power sector increases from a range of between 69,700 and 
77,600 jobs in 2011 to a range of between 135,200 and 146,800 jobs in 2020. This is 
mainly due to increases in gas-fired capacity and in RES installed capacity (especially 
wind and solar energy).  
Employment in RES is set to double from 50,000 jobs in 2011 to 103,500 jobs in 2020. By 
then, employment in RES represents a share of 70% to 77% of the employment in the 
power sector. The increase is especially large in wind energy, which increases from 
15,800 to 51,600 jobs, and in solar energy, which increases from 10,000 to 35,400 jobs 
between 2011 and 2020. 
The increase in gas-fired capacity results in a growth in the number of jobs from 
between 14,900 and 21,000 in 2011 to between 25,500 and 35,700 in 2020. 
1.4.5 Conclusions 
Employment in primary fuels in Spain is projected to increase in the decade until 2020, 
unlike in the EU. This would be accompanied by an increase of employment in the 
power sector, driven by an increase in RES capacity and, to a smaller extent, in gas-
fired capacity, following EU trends. Table 34 summarises the results. 
                                                   
91 The same number of jobs in coal mining as in 2011 is assumed for 2020, due to a lack of data for 
calculating employment in coal in 2020. 
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Table 34. Current and projected direct employment in 2020 in the energy sector in Spain, lower 
range 
 2011 2020 
Primary fuels 18,018 30,353 
Power sector 69,745 135,243 
Total 87,763 165,596 
Source: own calculations. 
However, given the current uncertain regulatory framework for RES, the projections of 
the Renewable Energies Plan 2011-2020 can be put in doubt. It is likely that the actual 
installed capacity will be lower than projected, thus creating fewer jobs than the results 
of this case study suggest. 
Moreover, a decrease in direct employment in the renewable energy sector has already 
been observed since the economic crisis, with a decrease from 75,000 jobs in RES in 
2008 to 54,000 jobs in 2011 (APPA, 2011). 
It is important to note that the results of the Spanish case study need to be taken with 
care because of the use of the EU employment factors for the calculations. Indeed, as 
the EU employment factors are overall higher than the Spanish employment factors 
(except for coal mining and biomass), the multiplication of future energy volumes and 
installed capacity by the EU factors leads to abnormally high results. This shows that 
the assumed convergence of EU economies may only come true in the long term, 
making short-term results of the case studies very sensitive to the choice of using 
national or EU employment factors. In the case of Spain, the increase of the 
employment level by 2020 in primary fuels results more from choosing EU 
employment factors than from changes in the energy mix. 
1.5 Conclusions 
The case study on Poland suggests that employment in primary fuels in countries that 
have a high share of coal in their energy mix may decrease under the measures taken 
to achieve climate objectives. Similarly, a slowdown in the construction of new fossil-
fired capacity in the power sector may result in job losses. The extent to which 
employment in the total energy sector increases depends then on the deployment of 
RES capacity. 
The case study on Sweden shows that even a full phase out of fossil fuels can have a 
positive net effect on the employment level. 
The case study on Spain suggests that an aggressive RES deployment strategy is 
accompanied by a strong deployment of gas-fired power plants, thus increasing the 
overall employment level. However, despite the substantial RES potentials in Spain, 
these may not be realised due to financial constraints resulting from the economic 
crisis. This may translate into fewer jobs as well. 
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Annex 2: List of interviewees 
European institutions and agencies: 
- European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) 
- European Commission, DG Energy 
- European Commission, Eurostat 
Industry and professional associations: 
- Eurogas, which represents the European gas wholesale, retail and distribution 
sectors 
- European Association for Coal and Lignite (Euracoal) 
- European Atomic Forum (Foratom) 
- European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) 
- European Renewable Energy Council (EREC) 
- Europia, which represents the oil refining and marketing industry in Europe 
- International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) 
- Observatoire des Energies Renouvelables (Observ’ER)  
- Union of the Electricity Industry (Eurelectric) 
International organisation: 
- OECD 
Research institutes and consultancies: 
- Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftliche Strukturforschung mbH (GWS) 
- Fraunhofer 
Information obtained from interviews is used throughout the paper and generally 
assigned to the respective organisations but not to the experts interviewed. Much of 
the information obtained served to identify and clarify existing data in order to 
optimally integrate it into the paper. In some cases, data from interviews is used in 
calculations but is not directly reported in the document. In other cases, information 
was confidential. 
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Annex 3: Disaggregation of LFS data with SBS and DG Energy figures 
SBS until 2009 and DG Energy estimates for 2011 cover a more detailed breakdown of 
energy activities than the LFS. On the basis of the proportions of each category in the 
detailed breakdown of SBS/DG Energy estimates, the LFS figures are broken down 
following the same classification. The result is a comparable breakdown of energy 
activities in DG Energy estimates and LFS data. 
Available figures for direct jobs in the energy sector in SBS, DG Energy estimates and 
the LFS are reported in Table 35.  
Table 35. Direct employment in the energy sector in the EU27 
Activity  SBS, 
2009 
DG 
Energy, 
2011 
LFS, 2011 
Mining of coal and lignite [B05] 256,500 229,401 345,000 
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas [B06] 75,700 67,618 91,500 
Extraction of crude petroleum [B06.1] 50,400   
Extraction of natural gas [B06.2] 25,300   
Extraction of peat [B08.92] 12,100 11,678  
Support activities for petroleum and natural gas 
extraction [B09.1] 
39,600 45,553  
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products [C19] 
133,200 127,355 210,700 
Manufacture of coke oven products [C19.1] 9,900 8,915  
Manufacture of refined petroleum products [C19.2] 123,300 118,440  
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
[D35] 
1,203,700 1,198,854 1,650,200 
Electricity [D35.1] 885,500 888,358  
Gas [D35.2] 154,04692 150,796  
Total (B05, B06, B08.92, B09.1, C19, D35.1, D35.2)  1,556,646 1,520,759  
Sources: Eurostat (2013c, 2013d); European Commission (2013a). 
 
SBS data provides a complete breakdown of energy activities in 2009. The share of 
employment of each energy activity in total employment in the energy sector can thus 
be calculated. These shares are used to breakdown DG Energy estimates and LFS data 
where necessary. On that basis, Table 36 gives a completed version of Table 35. Figures 
in italics are those derived from SBS and DG Energy proportions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
92 DG Energy estimate (European Commission, 2013a). 
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Table 36. Direct employment in the energy sector in the EU27 
Activity   SBS, 
2009 
DG Energy, 
2011 
LFS, 2011 
Mining of coal and lignite [B05] 256,500 229,401 345,000 
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
[B06] 
75,700 67,618 91,500 
Extraction of crude petroleum [B06.1] 50,400 45,304  61,305 
Extraction of natural gas [B06.2] 25,300 22,314  30,195 
Other mining and quarrying [B08] 221,700   238,700 
Extraction of peat [B08.92] 12,100 11,678 11,920 
Mining support service activities [B09] 45,500   125,900 
Support activities for petroleum and natural gas 
extraction [B09.1] 
39,600 45,553 95,439 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products [C19] 
133,200 127,355 210,700 
Manufacture of coke oven products [C19.1] 9,900 8,915 14,749 
Manufacture of refined petroleum products [C19.2] 123,300 118,440 195,951 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
[D35] 
1,203,700 1,198,854 1,650,200 
Electricity [D35.1] 885,500 888,358 1,221,148 
Gas [D35.2] 154,04693 150,796 214,526 
Total (B05, B06, B08.92, B09.1, C19, D35.1, D35.2)  1,556,646 1,520,759 2,190,233 
Source: Author, based on Eurostat (2013c, 2013d); European Commission (2013a). 
 
 
Annex 4: Employment in the power sector based on Eurelectric data 
In its 2012 statistical report on the power sector, Eurelectric (2012) provides 
employment figures for eight member states. This study relates Eurelectric figures to 
the total employed workforce94 in those eight countries. In all cases, the employment 
share of the power sector within total employment varies between 0.35% and 0.61%. 
The average share for the eight member states is 0.52%. The extrapolation of that 
average to the employed workforce in the EU27 results in about 1.1 million people 
working in the power sector.95 This places it between estimates of DG Energy and LFS 
data reported in Table 36. 
  
                                                   
93 DG Energy estimate (European Commission, 2013a). 
94 15 to 64 years old. 
95 1,057,700 out of a population of 503,700,000 (Eurostat, October 2012). 
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Annex 5: Employment in RES 
This study was confronted with a shortcoming of Eurostat in assessing the number of 
jobs in the renewable energy sector. In NACE, RES are included together with non-
renewable energy sources in class D35.11 “Production of electricity”, which cannot be 
broken down by technology. Data for activities in the renewable energy sector other 
than power generation, such as the manufacturing of components for plants, 
installation, transport of equipment, decommissioning, and R&D activities, are spread 
among various classes in NACE Rev. 2. 
Eurostat is currently developing a data collection module, including a gap-filling 
exercise for employment data, for the environmental goods and services sector (EGSS), 
which covers RES. 
As a consequence, data on employment in the renewable energy sector in this study 
comes from other sources. EurObserv’ER estimates employment in RES at 1,144,210 
jobs in 2011. That figure is also conveyed by EREC. REN21 provides a similar 
estimation of 1,117,000 jobs in 2011. These figures include direct and indirect jobs. 
The number of direct jobs within the total of direct and indirect jobs is calculated on the 
basis of multipliers of direct to indirect jobs. Multipliers are technology-specific and are 
taken from a study commissioned by IEA’s Implementing Agreement on Renewable 
Technology Deployment (Nathani et al., 2012). That report provides direct and indirect 
job numbers separately for each renewable technology in nine different countries. The 
multipliers used in this study are averages of the multipliers of the six EU member 
states included in the nine countries. Table 37 summarises the number of direct jobs 
and the multipliers of direct to indirect jobs for RES in 2011. 
Table 37. Direct employment in the renewable energy sector in the EU27 in 2011 
 Direct jobs Direct to indirect jobs multiplier Direct + indirect jobs 
RES, including: 577,581  1,186,460 
Biogas 45,481 1.56 70,950 
Biomass 181,556 0.51 274,150 
Geothermal 34,430 0.49 51,300 
Small hydropower 14,755 0.63 24,050 
Solar PV 120,436 1.59 311,930 
Solar thermal 27,659 0.76 48,680 
Waste 16,774 0.55 26,000 
Wind 136,490 0.98 270,250 
Source: Author, based on Liébard (2012) and Nathani et al. (2012). 
Results are in line with the estimation of 607,000 direct jobs in RES-E and RES-H in 
2010 by Teske et al. (2012). 
  
IMPACT OF THE DECARBONISATION OF THE ENERGY SYSTEM ON EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE  83 
 
Annex 6: Employment in the nuclear sector 
Eurostat NACE statistical classification includes employment in nuclear power 
generation in category D35.11 “Production of electricity”. However, no breakdown of 
this overall employment figure is available for individual power sources such as 
nuclear power. 
The European Atomic Forum (Foratom, 2010) provides an estimate of 125,000 direct 
jobs in the EU nuclear sector in 2010. Some national associations of the nuclear industry 
also provide employment figures, but they are not used in this study for various 
reasons: some do not cover employment in the full sector, but only in their member 
companies, some provide figures that are too high compared with other countries, and 
as such, are not considered reliable; and some asked for the source not to be quoted. 
For these reasons, the figure used in this study for employment in nuclear power 
generation is the one from Foratom. 
Annex 7: CIM and O&M employment factors in the power sector 
For the power sector, a distinction is made between jobs in operation and maintenance 
(O&M) and jobs in construction, installation and manufacturing (CIM). The reason is 
that jobs in CIM do not last for the full lifetime of a power plant, in contrast to jobs in 
O&M.  
O&M employment factors are expressed in jobs/MW. CIM employment factors are 
expressed in job-years per installed capacity, as the whole process of construction, 
installation, and manufacturing is usually not linked to a specific year. In order to have 
comparable employment factors for both CIM and O&M jobs, CIM job-years/MW are 
converted into CIM jobs/MW. This is done by dividing the job-years/MW by the 
technology-specific lifetime of an installation. 
To derive separate employment factors for O&M and CIM from the factor of total 
jobs/MW, factors for CIM and O&M jobs per technology in the OECD are taken from 
Rutovitz and Harris (2012). In this paper, the share of each factor in the total 
employment factor in Rutovitz and Harris (2012) is used to break down the total factor 
in jobs/MW into O&M and CIM employment factors. 
Table 38. Shares of CIM jobs and O&M jobs in total employment per technology in EU27 (%) 
Technology Share of CIM jobs Share of O&M jobs 
Coal 76 24 
Gas 57 43 
Nuclear 56 44 
Small hydro 18 82 
Wind 63 37 
Solar PV 70 30 
Biomass 27 73 
Biogas96 25 75 
Geothermal 47 53 
Source: based on Rutovitz and Harris (2012). 
                                                   
96 Based on Liébard (2012). 
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